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JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN SCIENCE
AND THE HUMANITIES
DAN PRIEL*
ABSTRACT
For a long time philosophy has been unique among the humanities for
seeking closer alliance with the sciences. In this Article I examine the
place of science in relation to legal positivism. I argue that, historically,
legal positivism has been advanced by theorists who were also positivists
in the sense the term is used in the philosophy of social science: they were
committed to the idea that the explanation of social phenomena should be
conducted using similar methods to those used in the natural sciences. I
then argue that since around 1960 jurisprudence, and legal positivism in
particular, has undergone change toward anti-positivism. Central to this
trend has been the idea that proper jurisprudential inquiry must be
conducted from the "internal point of view." This view amounted to an
attempt to combine a scientific-like aim of neutral description with a
humanistic method of inquiry. It thus did not entirely abandon its links
with scientific inquiry, but it has radically changed their nature. I show
that this stance has had a negative impact of narrowing both the range of
issues discussed and the kind of method considered appropriate for
discussing these questions. I then argue that to counter these isolationist
trends jurisprudence would benefit from reorientation of its midway
position between science and the humanities in the opposite direction. its
aims should be those traditionally associated with the humanities but it
should try to bring new insight to these questions with a methodology
much closer to that of the sciences.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1959 C.P. Snow published a book and coined a phrase. A scientist
turned novelist, Snow felt at home in both the arts and the sciences. Based
on his acquaintance with ideas and people of both camps, he argued that
there was a growing chasm driving them apart: "constantly I felt I was
moving among two groups . . . who had almost ceased to communicate at
all, who in intellectual, moral and psychological climate had so little in
common that instead of going from Burlington House or South
Kensington to Chelsea, one might have crossed an ocean."' In the years
that followed, matters only worsened, and they reached a nadir in the
1990s when humanists published articles denouncing scientists for holding
naYvely to a discredited model of objective reality, and scientists in turn
denounced humanities work as intellectually worthless.2 And though the
air seems calmer now, it is hard to say that there is much debate between
the two cultures. Different subject matters, different methodologies, and
increased specialization make such conversation all too difficult.
1. CHARLES PERCY SNow, THE TWO CULTURES 2 (Canto ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998)
(1959). Burlington House is the location of five scientific learned societies; Kensington and Chelsea
are neighborhoods associated with the London literati.
2. See PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN LEVITT, HIGHER SUPERSTITION: THE ACADEMIC LEFT AND
ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE (1994); ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE:
POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE (1998).
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For a long time philosophy has stood in a rather awkward position
between science and the humanities. In university departmental divisions,
in bookstores, and, I think, in popular opinion, philosophy is (still) almost
invariably classified among the humanities. But if one looks a bit more
closely, the impression is quite different. For example, in debates
surrounding Derridean deconstruction, most "analytic" philosophers were
critical of what two prominent philosophers described as the "the sloppy
and naive quality of what passes for philosophical argument in cultural
studies... ." Perhaps wary of what they perceived as the "anything goes"
feel of work in some quarters of the humanities, philosophers sought to
imitate the methods of scientists with a style of argumentation that is more
reminiscent of the sciences. Philosophical arguments often are advanced
using formal languages, and, even when not, precision and clarity are very
highly prized.4 A philosophical article often aims to show that certain
conclusions do (or do not) follow deductively from certain premises. Even
the "testing" of philosophical ideas bear some resemblances to scientific
method: a philosophical thesis is subjected to the philosophical
community's "replication" in the philosophical labs known as seminar
rooms, where attempts are made at refuting it by means of
counterexamples. If too many counterexamples are found, the thesis is
rejected.
The links and similarities do not end here. The wide currency of some
views-such as monism in the philosophy of mind and physicalism in
metaphysics-is in part the result of certain scientific discoveries. And
philosophers have been drawing heavily on science in many other areas of
philosophy as well. As for the future, many philosophers believe that the
answers to some old philosophical chestnuts depend, to varying degrees,
on future advances in science, not philosophy. Most prominently in the
philosophy of mind, but also in areas such as ethics and philosophy of
action, there are now voices arguing that many of the questions with which
philosophers have been struggling for centuries are in fact empirical
questions, and that they will ultimately be answered by the empirical
methods of science.
It would be wrong, however, to think that this is the whole story. There
are other philosophers who argue that the philosophical enchantment with
3. Paul Boghossian & Thomas Nagel, Letter to the Editor, LINGUA FRANCA, July Aug. 1996,
available at http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9607/tsh.html (last visited May 30, 2012); see also
John R. Searle, Literary Theory and Its Discontents, 25 NEw LITERARY HIST. 637 (1994).
4. For similar observations, see John R. Searle, The Future of Philosophy, 354 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS. ROYAL SoC'Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 2069,2071 (1999).
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science is a mistake and that the appropriate location of philosophy and
the appropriate way of doing philosophy should remain firmly within the
humanities. Like their fellow philosophers, these writers strive for clarity
and precision in argument, but they consider it a mistake to confuse clarity
of expression with scientific aims. The reason has to do with perspective:
on this view, philosophy, like the rest of the humanities, looks at events
from the human perspective, and aims to explain the world from that
*5
perspective.
In one form at least, this debate among philosophers will be familiar to
legal philosophers, as it is very closely connected to the distinction
between the "internal" and the "external" points of view introduced into
6jurisprudence by H.L.A. Hart. Much has been written on the internal
point of view, on what Hart meant by this term, on the significance of the
internal point of view to his work, and on its relevance to jurisprudence
more generally. But not much has been said on where the distinction
between the internal and the external points of view places jurisprudence
in the debate between the humanistic and scientific cultures. The purpose
of this Article is to explore these issues. Even though Hart's use of these
terms is not very clear, at their core is the distinction between humanistic
understanding and scientific explanation of human behavior.8
The place of legal philosophy or analytic jurisprudence (I use these
terms interchangeably) in relation to science and the humanities is an
important subject to explore for at least three reasons. First, contemporary
jurisprudential debates should be connected to the history of the subject.
Contemporary analytic jurisprudence is strongly a-historical-both in the
sense that it cares little for the role of history and tradition within law, and
in the little interest many of its proponents display for the history of
jurisprudence itself.9 This is unfortunate because it leads to excessive
focus on the work of a few recent writers at the expense of their
5. See, e.g, BERNARD WILLIAMS, PHILOSOPHY AS A HUMANISTIC DISCIPLINE 204-06 (A. W.
Moore ed., 2006) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, HUMANISTIC DISCIPLINE]; see also BERNARD WILLIAMS,
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY, at v-vi (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, ETHICS].
6. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-91 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HART, CONCEPT
OF LAW].
7. See, e.g., John D. Hodson, Hart on the Internal Aspect of Rules, 62 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS-
UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 381, 382-88 (1976); Frederick A. Siegler, Hart on Rules of Obligation, 45
AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 341, 350-55 (1967).
8. Hart was clear on this point when he explained the value of the internal point of view saying
that, "[f]or the understanding of [any form of normative social structure] the methodology of the
empirical sciences is useless . . . ." H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 13
(1983) [hereinafter HART, ESSAYS].
9. For clear statements to that effect see ANDREI MARMOR, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 118 (2011)
and John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5%' Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 199 (2001).
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intellectual ancestors, who have often been far more original and
interesting-exactly because many of them consciously considered the
question of the connections between a theory of law and a more
comprehensive explanation of human nature, society, and political
theory. 0
Second, the place of analytic jurisprudence between science and the
humanities is important for understanding how this approach to explaining
legal phenomena is currently practiced. In this Article I cannot discuss all
strands of analytic jurisprudence, but I will focus on two very influential
jurisprudential traditions, legal positivism and legal realism." By
examining the work of prominent legal positivists and legal realists, I hope
to highlight the way questions about the right relationship between
jurisprudence, science, and the humanities are implicit in the work of
many contemporary theorists. One aim of this Article is to demonstrate
how underneath the visible substantive debates between legal positivists
and their opponents, and perhaps even more so among legal positivists
themselves, there is an unacknowledged undercurrent: a debate on the
right way of doing philosophy. Indeed, I believe this undercurrent is
sometimes the best explanation of the substantive disagreements. I hope to
place the jurisprudential debates within the larger enterprise of
understanding law as a human practice and in this way connect with the
work of earlier legal philosophers who have had similar aims.
With respect to legal realism in particular, such an examination is
worthwhile both for understanding important differences among the legal
realists and also for seeing their relationships with legal positivism. Brian
Leiter has recently made the provocative claim that the legal realists are
best understood as legal positivists. He has tried to show that the two
approaches, usually thought to be inimical, in fact have a lot in common. I
will argue, by contrast, that we can better understand the similarities and
differences between legal positivism and legal realism by looking at their
views on the place of jurisprudence between science and the humanities.
10. See Dan Priel, Toiwards Classical Legal Positivism, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1886517.
11. My decision to focus on legal positivism and legal realism is not accidental. With regard to
legal positivism, its connection to analytic jurisprudence cannot be denied. In its early days the term
"legal positivism" was often used interchangeably with analytic jurisprudence. See, e.g, Roscoe
Pound, Fify Years of Jurisprudence, 1937 J. Soc'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 17, 25 (contrasting "analytical
jurisprudence" with natural law). Today, many, perhaps most, contemporary analytic legal
philosophers are legal positivists. The decision to focus also on the work of the legal realists is based
on the fact that there has been a great revival of interest in their work, even among legal philosophers
who in previous generations tended to be rather dismissive of the legal realists' work.
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This leads to my third reason for engaging in this question-namely,
the future of jurisprudence. If, as is plausible, jurisprudence is concerned
with the explanation of a certain aspect of human behavior we call "law,"
then examining the right methods for explaining human behavior and legal
behavior within it are clearly relevant-and the position of analytic
jurisprudence in relation to sciences and the humanities is clearly
important. I believe there is particular significance in engaging in this
question now because analytic jurisprudence seems to have been
marginalized within the legal academy in recent years. I will contend that
this stems partly from the position many legal philosophers have adopted
on the right methodology for jurisprudence.
My argument will develop in three stages. I will begin with an
examination of the relationship between legal positivism and the
philosophical doctrine known as positivism. Positivism is, roughly, the
view that the methods of the natural sciences are the right way to explain
social phenomena. I consider whether, as some have suggested, legal
positivism is best understood as the legal offshoot of positivism, or
whether, as others have argued, positivism and legal positivism share
nothing but a name.12
In Part II, I will argue that while legal positivism can be associated
historically with motivations similar to those at the core of positivism,
legal positivism has in the twentieth century undergone an anti-positivist
turn, especially due to the enormous influence of H.L.A. Hart's work. This
was not an outright rejection of positivism, but it is crucial for
understanding many of the central themes within contemporary legal
philosophy in general and legal positivism in particular.
In Part III, I will consider the work of the legal realists. Much of their
work is marked by a conscious attempt to overcome the limitations of
traditional legal methods by adopting what resembles a positivist outlook.
I consider whether this provides a basis for tying legal realism with legal
positivism. With the aid of the preceding discussion, I offer a complicated
answer. What many legal realists said seems to have strong ties with pre-
twentieth century legal positivism, but not (contrary to Leiter's view) with
its more recent incarnations.The historical discussion in Parts I, II, and III
helps situate and clarify much of the work done in jurisprudence today.
In Part IV, I will present attempts to find a viable middle-ground
between what is perceived to be the excesses of positivism and the "soft"
12. A note on terminology: the term "positivism" is often used as convenient shorthand for legal
positivism. In this Article, for obvious reasons, it does not.
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methods of the humanities. I argue that this resting point is unstable, but
that turning away from it may come at a high price: legal philosophy
seems able to retain a unique role for itself exactly because it can maintain
this midway position. A firm shift toward either a more scientific approach
or a more humanistic approach seems to lead to something that is no
longer recognizably a philosophical enterprise. That would suggest that
legal philosophy is doomed whether it keeps its methodological
foundations or it changes them. I conclude by offering some suggestions
as to what this seemingly difficult result may mean for the future of legal
philosophy. In particular, I suggest that there may still be some midway
position that legal philosophers could adopt, but it is very different from
the one presupposed in most contemporary jurisprudential work.
I. WHAT IS POSITIVISM?
A. The Varieties of Positivism
Consider the following two passages:
When legal positivists are labeled simply as "positivists," or it is
otherwise insinuated that they tend to share the broader
philosophical positions of e.g. Comte or Ayer-beware! It is usually
the pot calling the kettle black.13
Legal positivists . . . share with all other philosophers who claim the
"positivist" label (in philosophy of science, epistemology, and
elsewhere) a commitment to the idea that the phenomena
comprising the domain at issue (for example, law, science) must be
accessible to the human mind. This admittedly vague commitment
does little to convey the richness of positivism as a general
philosophical position, but it serves to indicate that the label, though
acquiring a very special meaning in legal philosophy, is not utterly
discontinuous with its use elsewhere in the philosophical tradition.14
13. Gardner, supra note 9, at 204 n.10; accord RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 20 n.31 (1990); WILFRID E. RUMBLE, DOING AUSTIN JUSTICE: THE RECEPTION OF
JOHN AUSTIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 238 n.10 (2005) ("Comtean
positivism . . . has little or nothing to do with legal positivism."); James Allan, Positively Fabulous:
Why It Is Good to Be a Legal Positivist, 10 CAN. J.L. & JuRIs. 231, 231 n.1 (1997) (using the term
positivism is "in no way ... meant to signify any acceptance of the philosophical doctrine known as
'logical positivism' as expounded by thinkers such as Hans Reichenbech, Rudolf Carnap and A.J.
Ayer.").
14. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
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These two quotations written by self-identified legal positivists originate
from different articles published within five years of each other. The
authors wrote these articles to dispel myths and present to an often
misinformed and confused world what-before all the differences,
factions, and disagreements that exist among legal positivists-the core of
legal positivism is. And, still, despite the qualifications in the second
passage, they reach very different conclusions on what would seem a
fundamental point-whether legal positivism has any family relation to
positivism. Yet in neither essay is the question of the relationship between
positivism and legal positivism pursued. Nor is it examined by many other
legal theorists who have expressed a view on the relationship (or lack
thereof) between the two.
Who is right in this debate? As is often the case in such matters, the
answer is "it depends." The problem with assessing these statements is
that both "positivism" and "legal positivism" have meant different things
to different people at different times. In its narrowest sense, "positivism"
refers to the views of Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who coined the term
in his Cours de philosophie positive, published in 1830. Comte had little
influence on the major figures associated with "classical" legal
positivism-surely not on Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who had been
dead long before Comte was born, or on Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832),
many of whose active years also preceded Comte. There is also little
evidence of Comte's influence on his contemporary John Austin (1790-
1859),1 or on any major twentieth century legal positivist.16 At least in
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241, 241 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). Similar claims are found in MORTON
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 210 (1992) ("[T]here is a close family relationship between legal, logical, and ethical
positivism . . . ."); Richard Nobles & David Schiff, Debating w1ith Natural Law: The Emergence of
Legal Positivism, in INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL THEORY: COMMENTARY AND
MATERIALS 90, 90-91 (James Penner et al. eds., 2002) (drawing links between legal positivism and
other kinds of positivism); Tom D. Campbell, The Point ofLegal Positivism, 9 KINGS C. L.J. 63, 72
(1998) ("there are close ties between legal positivism and the empiricist strand of logical positivism
..... ); Robert C.L. Moffat, The Perils of Positivism or Lon Fuller 's Lesson on Looking at Law,:
Neither Science Nor Mystery Merely Method, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 308 (1987) (stating
that the links between positivism and legal positivism "appear to be strong"); cf Hans J. Morgenthau,
Positivism, Functionalism, and International Laiw, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 260,261-63 (1940).
15. Austin actually knew Comte, and held him in high regard. See RUMBLE, supra note 13, at
238 n. 10. But there is no indication that he was influenced by Comte's ideas.
16. There is an intriguing possibility in John Stuart Mill. While not usually considered among the
ranks of the legal positivists, never having written much on law (see STEFAN COLLINI, PUBLIC
MORALISTS: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN BRITAIN 1830-1930, at 256-57
(1991)), Mill wrote two highly favorable reviews on John Austin's work. See John Stuart Mill,
Austin s Lectures on Jurisprudence, in 21 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 53 (1984)
[hereinafter Mill, Austin on Jurisprudence]; id. at 167. Mill also wrote extensively on Comte. See John
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Anglophone legal theory, his direct influence, then, seems negligible.'
The term positivism in philosophy is also sometimes used as shorthand
for the "logical positivism" of Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schlick, and other
members of the "Vienna Circle," as well as some contemporaneous British
philosophers, most notably A.J. Ayer. It is impossible to describe the ideas
of the logical positivists in a sentence, but it is fair to say that what
motivated their work was a rejection of what they perceived to be the
erroneous concern of philosophers with metaphysics. They perceived two
kinds of questions: empirical ones, for which only science can provide the
answer, and questions of meaning, for which the only answers possible
were tautologies. The logical positivists have argued that many
philosophers before them were wrong in thinking that there was a third
domain, that of metaphysical questions. The logical positivists sought to
show that these metaphysical questions were literally meaningless. And in
order to replace them, they sought to clarify the logical foundations of
scientific and linguistic inquiry. Once this had been achieved, they
believed, there would be no more role for philosophical inquiry.
Here, too, it is hard to find a real connection between the concerns and
ideas of the logical positivists and that of the legal positivists. In fact, there
are good reasons for thinking that the best known legal positivists of the
twentieth century have been opposed to it. In Nicola Lacey's biography of
H.L.A. Hart, she quotes a letter, written by Hart to his wife, in which he
harshly criticizes Ayer's book, Language, Truth, and Logic, as staunch a
defense of logical positivism as one could possibly find.18
Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism, in 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL,
supra, at 261 (1969) [hereinafter Mill, Auguste Comte and Povitism). However, as far as I could find,
there is no indication that Mill has drawn a link between Austin and Comte. Two points are worth
noting here. First, Austin never uses the term "positivism" or "legal positivism" to describe his views;
second and more important, as I will argue below, Austin may have been the first of the theorists
associated with legal positivism to break its links with positivist ideas. See text accompanying infra
notes 86-87 . It thus may not be surprising that Mill did not see any important connection between the
two. By contrast, Mill did say, although he did not discuss the matter at any length, that ideas similar
to Comte's positivism "formed the groundwork of all the speculative philosophy of Bentham." Mill,
Auguste Comte and Povitism, supra at 267. This is consistent with my claim below that in Bentham's
work there are obvious links between his positivism and his legal positivism. See text accompanying
infra notes 68-70.
17. Matters may be different with regard to Francophone jurisprudence. Consider for example
the suggestion that "Duguit attempts for the science of law what Auguste Comte attempted for
philosophy, to emancipate it from theology and metaphysics." W. Jethro Brown, The Jurisprudence of
M Duguit, 32 LAw Q. REV. 168, 168 (1916).
18. See NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM 35
(2004); see also Hart Interviewed: H.L.A. Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman, 32 J.L. &
SoC'Y 267, 275 (2005) [hereinafter Hart Intervieived] ("I reacted against Freddy Ayer. . . .").
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Another legal theorist who might be thought to provide the link
between the legal and logical positivism is Hans Kelsen, an Austrian-born
legal philosopher, who, despite some significant changes in views
throughout his long career, remained a lifelong legal positivist. Kelsen was
active in Vienna during the same period that the most prominent and
influential members of the Vienna Circle developed their ideas. But while
it is sometimes tentatively suggested that Kelsen's views may be related to
the intellectual milieu in Vienna at the time,19 and that some of his
characterizations of his own approach somewhat resemble ideas defended
by logical positivists,20 I do not think Kelsen could be described as a
logical positivist. 2 1 It would not be surprising to find that the ideas floating
around this relatively small intellectual community had some influence on
Kelsen. Indeed, I will, later on, suggest just that. But such a link does not
amount to an endorsement, on Kelsen's part, of the basic tenets of logical
positivism. 22 Apart from Kelsen, I do not think there is basis for any
serious suggestion that legal positivism and logical positivism are related
23in important ways.
B. The Elements of Positivism
All this would suggest that propoponents of the view that there is no
significant connection between positivism and legal positivism are correct.
But the term "positivism" is used in a broader sense, to describe a position
with an older provenance than what we find in the work of the logical
positivists or even that of Auguste Comte, the inventor of the term.24 There
are variations in detail, but in this broader sense positivism stands for a
19. See, e.g., ALLAN JANIK & STEPHEN TOULMIN, WITTGENSTEIN'S VIENNA 15, 133 (rev. ed.
1996); JUDITHN. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 41 (2d ed. 1986).
20. For example, Kelsen described his theory, which he called "the pure theory of law," as a
"radically realistic and empirical [science,]" and contrasted it with the natural law approach, which
was "metaphysics." See Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55
HARV. L. REV. 44, 49 (1941) [hereinafter Kelsen, Analytical Jurisprudence]; cf Jes 3jarup, Legal
Realism or Kelsen Versus Heigerstri5m, 9 RECHTSTHEORIE BEIHEFT 243, 253-54 (1986).
21. See Clemens Jabloner, Kelsen and his Circle: The Viennese Years, 9 EUR. J. INTL L. 368,
378-82 (1998); Stanley L. Paulson, The Theory of Public Law in Germany 1914 1945, 25 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 525, 538 & n.77 (2005).
22. See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing the relationship between Kelsen and the logical positivism).
23. See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 147-48
(1982) (reaching a similar conclusion).
24. For this usage of the term positivism see, for example, Anthony Giddens, Introduction to
POSITIVISM AND SOCIOLOGY 1, 3-4 (Anthony Giddens ed., 1974). See also DAVID PAPINEAU, FOR
SCIENCE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1-2, 185 n.1 (1979) (distinguishing different senses of the term
"positivism" among scientists and philosophers of science).
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combination of methodological and substantive views, which can be
summarized in the following terms:
(1) Materialism: the belief that the world consists only of physical
stuff, and the corresponding denial of the existence of any
nonphysical material. 25 Though this is not a matter of logical
entailment, materialists are often skeptics about values, or, at least,
about robust versions of moral realism. It is not hard to see why: if
values are not a separate entity "out there," then moral and political
discourse can only make sense if it is translated to measurable
standards like preference satisfaction, maximization of well-being,
and so on.
(2) Scientism: the methodological view according to which
knowledge should be attained by following scientific methods and
goals, especially those of the natural sciences. A central aim of the
scientific method is to provide an objective description and
explanation of phenomena in the world, one that could be used for
prediction future events. There is a range of methods for attaining
this goal (with different scientific disciplines sometimes adopting
different methods), but one relevant feature they share is the
insistence on a separation between the person involved in the
inquiry and her object of inquiry.
(3) Anti-historicism: Positivists often reject the view that
understanding how things are today requires consideration of
particular path-dependent historical routes. In the context of human
affairs, positivism is the rejection of the value of genealogy or
26
narrative as forms of explanation.
25. I use the somewhat dated term "materialism" instead of the more current, and to an extent
overlapping, terms "naturalism" or "physicalism." "Naturalism" has been used with such a broad range
of meanings that using it here is liable to lead to confusion, especially given that in jurisprudential
contexts natural law theories are sometimes called naturalistic, even though such theories are often the
exact opposite of what most naturalists mean by the term. "Physicalism" is less ambiguous, but may be
too strict, and perhaps also a bit anachronistic when used to describe the views of, say, Hobbes.
However, the distinction between materialism and physicalism is not clear-cut. The definitions of
materialism in J.J.C. Smart, Materialism, 60 J. PHIL. 651, 651-52 (1963) and in 2 DAVID LEwIs,
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, at x (1986), are very close to what many would nowadays call "physicalism."
26. (2) and (3) may seem at first like different ways of saying the same thing. But this is not the
case. In fact, some of the natural sciences may not be positivistic in the sense with which I use the term
here; evolutionary biology is probably the most notable example of a historical science (in biology
"everything is the way it is because it got that way," as biologist D'Arcy Thompson is reputed to have
said). Daniel Dennett, It 's Not a Bug, It's a Feature, 7 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD., no. 4, 2000 at 25, 25.
And as we shall see, many legal philosophers adopt (3) (and (1)) but reject (2).
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(4) Minimal role for the analysis of language in explanation: The
earlier points lead rather straightforwardly to giving a minimal role
to the analysis of language. The primary role of explanation is to
help in understanding the world by revealing or clarifying the
fundamentals of physical or metaphysical reality. Existing linguistic
conventions stand in no privileged position regarding these
questions. In fact, given the profound ignorance of most language
speakers to many of the issues calling for explanation, language
should be treated with mistrust for its potential to mislead. For this
reason, positivists often argue that scientific explanation should
strive to abandon natural languages and adopt instead the more
precise languages of mathematics and logic. 27
There are obvious connections between the four elements. Materialism, for
example, leads naturally to the view that the methods of natural science
that have been used to explain the material world exhaust the correct
methods of explanation because there is nothing else to explain. It also
leads to the view that there is little to be gained from the "internal"
analysis of language. The combination of (1) and (2) also leads to another
view often associated with positivism, that the explanation of phenomena
is best made by breaking them into their constituent elements. Related to
all of this is the controversial idea of scientific reduction-the view that
social phenomena are to be explained in the language of biology-which
itself should be explained in the language of chemistry and ultimately in
the language of physics.
Many anti-positivists will not quarrel with any of this so long as what
is being sought is the explanation of natural phenomena. The difficulty lies
with the explanation of human action, which many anti-positivists deny
could be adequately explained (or understood) using the methods of
science. We can call anti-positivist any view that rejects, in the context of
human action and behavior, at least one of the four ideas I associated with
positivism in favor of one of the following:
(1*) Holism: Human action can be understood only within the
culture within which it took place. Culture is a set of ideas,
attitudes, and meanings that affect a person's perception of reality in
a holistic way, and cannot be reduced or broken down to its physical
ingredients.
27. See AJ. Ayer, Editor's Introduction to LOGICAL POSITIVISM 3, 9-10, 24-28 (A.J. Ayer ed.,
1959). On the willingness of logical positivists to challenge linguistic practices, see ROBERT VON
MISES, POSITIVISM: A STUDY IN HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 332-33 (1951).
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(2*) Internal understanding: Unlike natural objects that can be
explained by external observation, the mark of intentional action-
that is, the mark of what makes humans human-is that it depends
on the particular meaning with which it is taken. Meaning is a
concept that cannot be understood, let alone explained, by
28
observation. Consequently, the purpose of an explanation of
human behavior is not prediction of future behavior, but, rather,
understanding the reasons that brought it about. Since there is no
way of "translating" reasons for action to causal description, any
attempt to offer a scientific account of human action is bound to
fail.
(3*) Historicism: the view that a true explanation of how things
currently are will necessarily involve an account of how they
developed to their current state from their inception, and that any
explanation that fails to do that is for this reason inadequate.
(4*) Constitutive role for language and, therefore, a central role for
the analysis of language in the explanation of human action: On
some anti-positivist views, the goal of philosophical explanation is
to provide an account of the way people understand the world, and
examining the way people use language is the primary means for
doing so. As such, it is properly considered the object of our
inquiry. Linguistic usage is not studied to be corrected, but for the
evidence to be gleaned from it about people's understanding. The
role of explanation on this view is to make sense, or, to use a word
much loved by anti-positivists, to "elucidate" our linguistic
usages.29 Philosophical inquiry takes the linguistic concepts as
given and tries to explain, not to challenge, them: "[Philosophical
problems] are problems, difficulties, and questions about the
concepts we use in various fields, and not problems, difficulties, and
questions which arise within the fields of their use. (A philosophical
28. See Isaiah Berlin, The Divorce Between the Sciences and the Humanities, in AGAINST THE
CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 80, 96 (Henry Hardy ed., 1979) (discussing Vico's
ideas).
29. See, e.g., P. F. Strawson, Carnaps s Views on Constructed Systems Versus Natural Languages
in Analytic Philosophy, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP 503, 509 (Paul Arthur Schipp ed.,
1963) [hereinafter Strawson, Natural Language] ("[T]he elucidation of concepts ... can coexist with
perfect mastery of their practical employment. Now this is precisely the need for their philosophical
elucidation."); P.F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS: AN ESSAYS IN DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS 9 (1959)
("Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world,
revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure."). The similarity between the first
quote and what Hart says in HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at 2-3, is remarkable.
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problem about mathematics is not a mathematical problem.)"30
Attention should be paid to linguistic usage, then, because language
is not merely evidence of social reality; it is a reflection of it.
The contrast between (4) and (4*) is particularly helpful in highlighting
the different intellectual background of the two approaches. The anti-
positivist tries to understand the social "world" constructed by humans
beyond and outside the physical world, and she argues that the only way to
understand this constructed world is from "within"-that is, by using
concepts and ideas belonging to this constructed world. Anti-positivists
thus need not (and usually do not) deny the existence of a physical world
and that science (or scientific method) are reliable methods for knowing
what it is. Rather, they contend that there is a separate domain, created by
thought and language (the exact relationship or priority between the two
being a matter of much debate) that is transparent to scientific method, and
as such requires the humanistic methods of judgment and interpretation for
understanding it. To the positivist, by contrast, the whole point of
explanation is to put all these social phenomena on par with the
explanation of other phenomena in the world, and the way to do it is by
trying to see how such worlds of meaning are possible within a world
described in materialistic terms.
C. Positivism and the Separation of "Is" and "Ought"
Before continuing, we must attend to another idea often associated with
positivism, one that is sometimes used as a link between positivism and
legal positivism-the distinction between "is" and "ought," or between
fact and value. These two distinctions are not identical, but they are
interrelated, and insisting on their significance is sometimes taken to be
the mark of both positivism and legal positivism.31 Thus, the defining
slogan of legal positivism, and what I will here take it to stand for, is that
"[t]he existence of law is one thing, its merit or demerit is another."32 By
30. Strawson, Natural Language, supra note 29, at 515; cf P.F. Strawson, Two Conceptions of
Philosophy, in PERSPECTIVES ON QUINE 310 (Robert E. Barrett & Roger F. Gibson ed., 1990).
Strawson contrasts two approaches to philosophy but concludes that "[e]ach has validity on its own
terms." Id. at 318 (emphasis added). Strawson thus seems to turn even the positivist position into a
linguistic enterprise.
31. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REv. 797, 800 n.5 (1993)
(considering the is/ought distinction as a link between positivism and legal positivism).
32. JOHN AuSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 157 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed.,
1995). See also Kelsen, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 20, at 52; Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis
of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201, 204 (1931) [hereinafter Cohen, Ethical Basis] ("Law is law,
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contrast, one often finds in the work of legal positivism's critics a rejection
of the possibility of clearly distinguishing between the two. Lon Fuller, for
example, argued that "nature does not, as the positivist so often assumes,
present us with the is and the ought in neatly separated parcels." 3
It is not difficult to see why positivists would be attracted to the idea
that there is a clear distinction between what ought to be the case and what
is the case. There is a clear path from the four positivist tenets described
above and the view that, in explaining the world, one should strive, as
natural scientists do, to understand what exists and distinguish it clearly
from what is desired or ought to be the case: there is always room for
criticizing the law, but in order to do that one needs to know what it is
first. By contrast, those who believe that an account of what things are
cannot (or should not) be separated from individuals' understanding or
interpretation of events will tend to the view that a clear distinction
between description of social phenomena and their evaluation is untenable.
This is so because individuals' understandings of what things are will
always be colored, however imperceptibly, by their judgments of how
things ought to be.34
But the distinction between "is" and "ought" can also be misleading,
for it is also sometimes used as determinative of whether there is a
distinction between factual and evaluative questions. Here, we often see an
almost complete reversal of positions between positivists and
nonpositivists. The reason is that positivists are materialists, which means
that for them there really is only one domain, that of the "is."
Consequently, their explanation of normative discourse necessarily gets
"translated" into the factual language of preferences, dispositions, likes or
dislikes, the sort of stuff that (in principle) could be empirically
determined. For example, Jeremy Bentham has argued that the basis of all
his work, the principle of utility, is grounded in empirical fact. As the
famous opening sentence of his Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation puts it, "[n]ature has placed mankind under the
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure."3 ' A different
whether it be good or bad, and only upon the admission of this truism can a meaningful discussion of
the goodness and badness of law rest").
33. LoN L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 7 (1940); accord RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 147-48 (1985).
34. See FULLER, supra note 33, at 7-10.
35. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11
(H.L.A. Hart & J.H. Bums eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1780/89); cf Cohen, supra note 32, at 202,
206 (complaining about the absence of "ethical science" (as opposed to the prevalence of "ethical
judgment") in legal commentary, and arguing for an inquiry that would be grounded in "judgment[s]
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positivist strategy involves explaining normative language in terms of
conditionals ("you ought to do this" means "if you wish to attain such-
and-such goal, do this"). The practical effect of this strategy, too, is to
eliminate the separate domain of "ought."
The result is often quite confusing: Bentham, a positivist, in fact
insisted on the importance of separating law as it is from law as it ought to
be, and he heaped criticism on (what he took to be) William Blackstone's
failure to do so. By describing both law and morality as matters of
(empirical) fact, Bentham was able constantly to elide the distinction
between law and morality while firmly maintaining the distinction
between law as it is and law as it ought to be. Similarly, Karl Llewellyn,
who insisted on the explanatory value of keeping "is" and "ought"
separate, also considered his views to be an embodiment of natural law
theory. By contrast, Ronald Dworkin, who has argued that "the flat
distinction between description and evaluation . . . has enfeebled legal
theory,"38 has also argued that the domains of fact and value are strictly
separate and that it is a fundamental error to confuse them.39
There is no inconsistency between these two positions because they
deal with separate questions: one with the explanation of social
phenomena; the other, with the metaphysics of morality and other
evaluative domains. Nonetheless, to avoid possible confusion, I will not
rely on the distinction between "is" and "ought" as the basis for
distinguishing positivists (legal or otherwise) from non-positivists. Instead,
I will only consider the four contrasting headings discussed in the previous
Part.
II. POSITIVISM AND LEGAL POSITIVISM
We can now return to whether the legal positivists are best understood
as positivist or anti-positivists. I will show that there is no simple answer
of ethical values whose truth is recognized to be partially dependent upon the accuracy of human
scientific knowledge ......").
36. See, e.g., VON MISES, supra note 27, at 332 (reducing "ought" statements to conditionals).
37. Compare Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1236-37 (1931) (stressing the importance of keeping "is" and "ought" apart) and
Karl N. Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method-A Realist's Critique, in ESSAYS ON
RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 89, 98-100 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Legal Tradition], with
Karl N. Llewellyn, One "Realist's" View of Natural Law for Judges, 15 NOTRE DAME LAW. 3, 8
(1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Natural Law] ("[T]he ultimate legal ideals of any of the writers who
have been called realists . . . resemble amazingly the type and even the content of the principles of a
philosopher's Natural Law.").
38. DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 148.
39. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 76-77 (2006).
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to this question and that different legal positivists have adopted distinctly
different views on the matter.
The term "positive law" is of much older provenance than that of
"positivism" or that of "legal positivism." The term originated around the
twelfth century as the opposite of natural law (although the idea of law
laid down by humans is obviously much older than that). At that time
"natural law" and "positive law" did not represent two competing schools
of jurisprudence, but rather two kinds of law, the former referring to the
laws laid down by God, the latter the laws promulgated by human political
authorities. Only centuries later did some scholars begin to question the
very idea of natural law and to think that the only law that existed was
positive law. It was with them that the distinction between legal positivism
and natural law as two competing theories about law was born.
The idea of positive law, then, was born independently of positivism
and is, in fact, much older than the legal theory now called legal
positivism.40 But this leaves open the question, to which I now turn,
whether the emergence of the theory of legal positivism-that is, the
rejection of the existence of natural laws-was itself influenced by
positivist ideas.
A. Positivist Legal Positivism
The earliest theorists we now call legal positivists advanced their ideas
at a time of great political and intellectual transformation. A period of
changing political structure with the emergence of states as the foremost
political entities in the international arena, it was the time in which the
divine right of kings to rule began to be questioned and rudimentary ideas
of representation as the basis for political legitimacy emerged. It was also
a period of remarkable advances in the natural sciences. The successes in
these areas were an inspiration for the first attempts to use similar methods
to explain humans, both in explaining the body in mechanical terms, and,
more importantly for our purposes, for explaining social and political
phenomena. Among the very first to explicitly pursue such an approach
was Thomas Hobbes.4 1
40. See Roberto Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 691, 696-97
(1957).
41. See PHILIP BALL, CRITICAL MASS: How ONE THING LEADS TO ANOTHER 1 37 (2004);
RICHARD PETERS, HOBBES 43 (2d ed. 1967).
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1. Thomas Hobbes
Whether Hobbes was a legal positivist is a matter of some
42
controversy. No doubt, if legal positivism is contrasted with natural law,
then it would seem odd to put on the side of legal positivism a theorist in
whose work natural laws and natural rights occupy such a prominent
place. But to think in this way is to impose twentieth century categories on
a thinker who would have not recognized them.43 Part of Hobbes's novelty
consisted in the role he gave natural law within his account. In at least two
important senses his work can be seen as the starting point for a new
political tradition. First, with respect to the relationship between
sovereignty and law-making power, Hobbes insisted (against the view of
prominent contemporary common lawyers) that the common law is a form
of delegated power from the sovereign.44 Second, Hobbes thought that
justice is the product of human law, not the pre-existing standard by which
human law is to be measured.45 With these ideas Hobbes charted a new
direction in both legal and political theory-although to distinguish
between these two would also be to read him anachronistically-a
direction that conveys many of the motivations found in the work of later
legal positivists.
However we label his ideas, what matters is to see how they are related
to his positivistic outlook. Hobbes's work displays clear adherence to the
four elements of positivism identified above.4 6 Hobbes was a materialist
who denied the existence of spirits or any other "incorporeal beings." 47 He
sought to explain not only human action in mechanistic terms, but also our
mental life, suggesting that our thought, emotions, and feelings of pleasure
and pain are the result of motions within our body. 48 His scientism was
42. Compare JEREMY WALDRON, THE LAW 33 (1990), George P. Fletcher, The Right and the
Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 965 (1985) (calling Hobbes "a seminal positivist"), and Gardner,
supra note 9, at 200, iwith Mark C. Murphy, Was Hobbes a Legal Positivist?, 105 ETHICS 846 (1995),
Claire Finkelstein, Hobbes and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1211 (2006), and
David Dyzenhaus, Hobbes and the Legitimacy of Law, 20 LAW & PHIL. 461 (2001). For my
explanation of the sense in which he was a legal positivist, and that complements the discussion here,
see Priel, supra note 10.
43. See generally Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST.
& THEORY 3 (1969).
44. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 186-87 (Richard Tuck ed., rev. student ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) [hereinafter HOBBES, LEVIATHAN].
45. Id. at 90 (ch. 13).
46. See generally A.P. MARTINICH, HOBBES 24-28 (2005).
47. See JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION 11-14 (1986).
48. See Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy. The First Section Concerning Body, in I THE
ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY 390, 405, 407 (1839) (1655) [hereinafter
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displayed in his distinction between scientific and non-scientific method.
The former was based on analysis of the complex in terms of the simpler
elements,49 and was marked by its ability to generate predictions (or
"knowledge of Consequences," as Hobbes called it). 0
His paradigm for the sort of secure knowledge that science can produce
was Euclidian geometry, to which he was first introducedat the age of
forty. Hobbes was reportedly amazed at the way simple axioms can lead in
a rigorous fashion to conclusions that at first sight seem to bear no relation
to the premises.51 (To accommodate geometry within his conception of
science grounded in causes and effects Hobbes had to explain that even
geometry is a mechanical science.52 ) Hobbes sought the same approach for
his civil science. In his view complex theories were derived from simpler
ideas, and, as such, were potentially as secure as a proof in geometry. Civil
science must therefore start with precise definitions, which provide precise
meaning for the words used and follow them to more complex
conclusions. It was an explanation that shows that "the causes of the
motions of the mind . . . by proceeding in the same way [as in the natural
sciences], come to the causes and necessity of constituting
commonwealths." 53 Hobbes in fact claimed to have been the first to apply
scientific method to questions of politics, and went as far as to declare
54himself the founder of a new science.
By contrast, Hobbes considered non-scientific explanation to be based
on dogma. It is here that words "have been aboundance coyned by
Schoolemen, and pusled Philosophers"; but in reality these words "are but
insignificant sounds." 55 Unlike science, here scholars "take up maxims
Hobbes, Elements] (§§ XXV.1, XXV.11-12); HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 44, at 46 ("Life it selfe
is but Motion. . . .") (ch. 6); PETERS, supra note 41, at 129-30.
49. THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 10 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthome eds. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1647) ("[A] thing is best known from its constituents.").
50. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 44, at 35 (ch. 5); accord Hobbes, Elements, supra note 48,
at 82 (§ VI.13) ("The end of science is the demonstration of the causes and generations of things"); cf
THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW NATURAL AND POLITIC 75 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1994) (1650) (§ XIII.4).
51. See A.P. MARTINICH, HOBBES: A BIOGRAPHY 84-85 (1999). Interestingly, Hobbes's work
prior to that period (now largely unread) is of a distinctly humanist flavor. See 3 QUENTIN SKINNER,
VISISONS OF POLITICS: HOBBES AND CIVIL SCIENCE 38, 65 (2002).
52. See Douglas Jesseph, Hobbes and the Method of Natural Science, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO HOBBES 86, 87-88 (Tom Sorell ed., 1996).
53. Hobbes, Elements, supra note 48, at 73-74 (§ VI.7). See also id, at 74 ("[T]he principles of
the politics consist in the knowledge of the motions of the mind .... ). Contra ToM SORELL, HOBBES
21 24 (1986).
54. See M.M. GOLDSMITH, HOBBES'S SCIENCE OF POLITICS 228-29 (1966).
55. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 44, at 30 (ch. 4); see also HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 11
(arguing that for Hobbes "[1]anguages with different domains do not establish independent worlds"
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from their education, and from the authority of men, or of custom, and
take the habitual discourse of the tongue for ratiocination. ,56 All this could
not be the basis for true scientific inquiry, which Hobbes thought should
avoid the historicist narrative style found in humanistic work.5
The extent to which Hobbes thought he could derive his political
philosophy from natural science is controversial among scholars.58 It must
be remembered, however, that the psychology and biology of his day were
at a rather primitive stage. Bearing this in mind, it is remarkable how
much Hobbes invested in trying to find a basis for his political and legal
theory in what he thought were empirical observations about human
nature. First and foremost, this is found in his explanation for the need for
law. In his account of human psychology, people were self-interested
beings who are motivated by "a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power
after power, that ceaseth onely in Death,"59 and it is for this reason that life
without an absolute sovereign would be the nightmare of "warre . . . of
every man, against every man."60 His positivism also informed his view
that the authority of law does not derive from reason but rather from an act
of will of the sovereign.6 This, for Hobbes, was an empirical observation,
not a theoretical conclusion. In taking this view, Hobbes was one of the
first to accept what would become a shibboleth for legal positivism, the
separation between legality and content, that is, the separation between the
conditions for something being a law and what that law says. In this,
Hobbes's work clearly displays a strong link between early positivism and
early legal positivism.
and that "the language of physics . .. can give us a complete description of the events of the
universe").
56. HOBBES, supra note 50, at 75 (§ XIII4) (emphasis omitted).
57. Luc Borot, History in Hobbes 's Thought, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HOBBES, supra
note 52, at 305, 306 ("[Hobbes] had to get rid of whatever sounded like a narrative style to achieve the
effect of demonstrative science .... ). For the contrast Hobbes drew between historical knowledge
and scientific knowledge, see also id. at 310-11; PETERS, supra note 41, at49 50.
58. See Noel Malcolm, Hobbes's Science of Politics and His Theory of Science, in ASPECTS OF
HOBBES 146 (2002).
59. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 44, at 70 (ch. 11). Hobbes also believed that it is "[d]esire
of Praise . . . [which] disposeth to laudable actions . . . ." Id. at 71 (ch. I1).
60. Id. at 88 (ch. 13).
61. "It is not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a Law." THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE
BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (Joseph Cropsey
ed., 1971) (1681).
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2. Jeremy Bentham and John Austin
It is with Bentham that many scholars find the true, unambiguous
beginnings of legal positivism.62 Though he shared many of his
methodological presuppositions with Hobbes, 3 in Bentham's account of
law there was no room for that "nonsense upon stilts," 64 natural rights, that
had such a central role in Hobbes's work.
A theme running through Bentham's work is the need to eradicate
imaginary "fictions" that bedevil thought, and to restate our knowledge on
firm empirical grounds. This first required finding out what really exists.
On this question Bentham's answer was clear: he was a materialist who
believed that "[t]he only objects that really exist are substances-they are
the only real entities."66 Once what exists was established, the question
was how it should be explained, and, here, as John Stuart Mill observed,
"Bentham's method may be shortly described as the method of detail; of
treating wholes by separating them into their parts, abstracting by
resolving them into Things....
Bentham relies on both this materialist metaphysics and his scientistic
methodology in his inquiries in the domains of morality and law. When
talking of Bentham's work on the law, the focus is often on his critique of
62. Even this characterization has been questioned. See Amanda Perreau-Saussine, Bentham and
the Boot-Strappers of Jurisprudence: The Moral Commitments of a Rationalist Legal Positivist, 63
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 346, 353-54 (2004); Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham, The Principle of Utility, and
Legal Positivism, 56 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 35 (2003) [hereinafter Schofield, Jeremy Bentham];
Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and HLA Hart's 'Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence',
1 JURISPRUDENCE 147 (2010). In part, these essays highlight the dangers of anachronism in using
contemporary categories to describe the views of theorists who would have not recognized them. In
this case, the interpretive difficulty with regard to Bentham's work largely dissipates once we
understand that, unlike contemporary legal positivists, Bentham was a positivist. As I said above,
perhaps ironically, positivist legal positivists have had little trouble with acknowledging connections
between law and morality while insisting on a separation between law as it is and law as it ought to be.
See the discussion in supra Part I.B.
63. On the methodological similarities between Hobbes and Bentham, see GERALD J. POSTEMA,
BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 314 (1986); James E. Crimmins, Bentham and Hobbes:
An Issue ofInfluence, 63 J. HIST. IDEAS 677, 679-80 (2002).
64. See JEREMEY BENTHAM, Nonsense upon Stilts, in RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND REFORM,
317, 317 (Philip Schofeild et al. 2002).
65. See Ross HARRISON, BENTHAM 24-46 (1983); PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1 27 (2006) [hereinafter SCHOFIELD,
UTILITY].
66. Schofield, Jeremy Bentham, supra note 62, at 13 (quoting Jeremy Bentham (unpublished
manuscript, on file with University College London as the Jeremy Bentham Papers, box lxix at 241)).
67. John Stuart Mill, Bentham, in 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 75, 83
(Univ. of Toronto Press 1969) (1838) (footnote omitted); accord L.J. HUME, BENTHAM AND
BUREAUCRACY 59 (1981).
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the common law for its obscurity, confusion, retroactivity, and much
more. But important for our purposes is what this attack tells us about
Bentham's philosophical outlook. For example, what Bentham found
fundamentally wrong in Blackstone's work was the place he gave to
tradition and history, factors that are of no value whatsoever in assessing
the merit of the law: "Our business is not with antiquities but with
Jurisprudence. The past is of no value but by the influence it preserves
over the present and the future. . . . Let us reflect that our first concern is to
learn how the things that are in our power ought to be. . . ." But even for
understanding how things are, there was little room for paying much
attention to what lawyers said about it. Bentham had little sympathy for
the view that understanding law required adopting the internal perspective
of the lawyer because he thought that much of legal discourse was
fictional: "[Lawyers] can no more speak at their ease without a fiction in
their mouth, than Demosthenes without pebbles. Such is the power of
professional prejudice to deprave the understanding." 69 For him, the
typical lawyerly tendency to become enclosed within the web of cross-
referential legal documents that use their "internal," technical jargon was a
sure way of obscuring reality, not grasping it. Blackstone's attempt of
rationalizing English law had many faults, but its most fundamental error
had been his attempt to make sense of the legal realm and to rationalize the
law from within, without ascertaining first which parts of it reflected
reality. 0
Bentham's alternative based law on foundations consistent with his
metaphysical worldview. As already mentioned, the starting point for his
ethical theory was the observation that "[n]ature has placed mankind under
the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure."" In this way
his utilitarian theory was intended to turn a soft area governed by
subjective prejudices and mere "unfounded sentiments" into an objective,
quantifiable, and measurable science; in other words, Bentham sought a
"reformation in the moral [world]"72 along the same line of methods and
developments found in the natural world. His goal was that ethics would
68. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON
GOVERNMENT 314 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London Athlone Press 1977) (1776)
[hereinafter BENTHAM, COMMENT] (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
70. See HARRISON, supra note 65, at 32-33; POSTEMA, supra note 63, at 271-72. Bentham
thought that lawyers adopted these fictions in part because it made their services necessary. See
SCHOFIELD, UTILITY supra note 65, at 126-28; POSTEMA, supra note 63, at 286.
71. BENTHAM, supra note 35, at 11.
72. See BENTHAM, COMMENT, supra note 68, at 393 (emphasis omitted).
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become "as nearly perfectly demonstrable as mathematics" by
"transferring the science of number to legislation.""
A scientific endeavor of this sort required understanding human nature,
which is why after outlining his goals at the outset of his Introduction to
the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham turned to an extended
discussion of intention, motives, pain, pleasure, and other psychological
phenomena.74 Only after clarifying those Bentham turned to morals and
legislation."
Another aspect of Bentham's work that derives from his positivistic
outlook was his conception of legal theory, which is thoroughly practical:
the main purpose of law on this view was to assist in achieving the goal of
greatest happiness to the greatest number of people, 6 and he thus
conceived of jurisprudence as the scientific study of the way to bring
about this goal in the most rational manner. It is thus conceived as a
"practical science"-the science of curing society of its ills. 1 To the
extent that Bentham's jurisprudence engaged in "conceptual" questions, he
did so only as much as he thought necessary for his concern with legal
reform. But even here he was faithful to his positivist credo: both his
account of what law is and his explanation of its normativity-the way in
which law obligates-are thoroughly grounded in observed fact.
73. MARY P. MACK, JEREMY BENTHAM: AN ODYSSEY OF IDEAS, 1748-1792, at 269 (1962). She
adds:
Throughout his entire life, throughout all the different branches of law, Bentham tried to
apply mathematics to morals and legislation: in private substantive law, with attempts to find
money equivalents for pleasures and pains; in procedure, by efforts to fix a scale of the
probative value of different kinds of evidence; and in private and constitutional law, by
considering the numbers of people affected as one test of right and wrong.
Id. at 270. In a book by Bentham entitled Deontology he says: "The law-giver should be no more
impassioned than the geometrician. They are both solving problems by sober calculation." 2 JEREMY
BENTHAM, DEONTOLOGY; OR THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY 19 (John Bowring ed., 1834). Though the
sentiment is clearly Benthamite, Bentham's authorship of much of this manuscript, including this
sentence, is suspect. See Amnon Goldworth, Editorical Introduction, in JEREMY BENTHAM,
DEONTOLOGY xi, xxx-xxxiii (Amnon Goldworth ed., 1983).
74. HARRISON, supra note 65, at 137-38.
75. By contrast, it should not come as a surprise that religion had no place within this enterprise.
See JAMES E. CRIMMINS, SECULAR UTILITARIANISM: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE CRITIQUE OF
RELIGION IN THE THOUGHT OF JEREMY BENTHAM 98 (1990) (for Bentham "[w]here religion was
opposed to utility it was pernicious, where it agreed with it, it was entirely superfluous"). On
Bentham's religious skepticism see also James E. Crimmins, Bentham on Religion: Atheism and the
Secular Society, 47 J. HIST. IDEAS 95 (1986); J.E. Crimmins, Bentham's Religious Radicalism
Revisited: A Response to Schofield, 22 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 494,499-500 (2001).
76. See SCHOFIELD, UTILITY, supra note 65, at 44-48.
77. See MACK, supra note 73, at 262, 264.
78. See P.M.S. Hacker, Sanction Theories of Duty, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
(SECOND SERIES) 131, 138 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973).
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Perhaps most interestingly, the accompanying psychological
methodology he came to adopt was "external," that is, he sought to explain
mental life by means of observed phenomena. His reasons for this
approach combine the familiar difficulty of knowing what goes on in other
people's minds79 with the less familiar (and given what we now know,
quite prescient) claim that the contents of a person's mind are often only
fuzzily known even to the person herself.80 This implies that even
introspection is an unreliable guide for individuals' mental states.
Bentham's alternative was to focus on the measurable effects of the law on
happiness.81 In all this he rejected what has become the hallmark of
contemporary legal positivism, the "internal point of view."
John Austin's theory of law is in many respects indebted to Bentham's
ideas-so much so that it is sometimes suggested that Austin had little
originality and that whatever minor fame he now enjoys is due only to the
accident of history that his writings on jurisprudence were more available
(and perhaps slightly more readable) than those of his greater mentor. 82
There is some truth to this claim-there is no doubt that Austin was much
influenced by Bentham-but it obscures their very significant differences.
I suspect this error is the result of only considering the surface of both
writers' jurisprudence while ignoring the very different philosophical
foundations on which it was built. These differences have led their legal
theories in different directions.
Austin and Bentham's intellectual temperaments were utterly different:
Bentham was a political radical, who tirelessly argued for universal
suffrage, the separation of church and state, decriminalization of
homosexual acts, improvements in prison conditions, and many other
causes decades before they became mainstream; Austin was an arch-
conservative who opposed most of these reforms. It is perhaps this
79. See MACK, supra note 73, at 231.
80. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 372-75 (1824). This is the orthodox view
among psychologists today. See John Mikhail, Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard
Posner's The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1057, 1093-94 & n.221
(2002) (book review).
81. See the discussion in SCHOFIELD, UTILITY, supra note 65, at 24-26, 75-77.
82. See, e.g., ELIE HALEVY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM 483 (Mary Morris
trans., 1928); cf DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 10-11 (1984) (suggesting that apart
from their differences on the divine foundations of morality Bentham's "legal and moral theory is
otherwise similar to Austin's").
83. It is sometimes suggested that Austin was (like Bentham) a philosophical radical. See, e.g.,
HART, ESSAYS, supra note 8, at 51-52; TOM D. CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL
POSITIVISM 4, 74 (1996). But this is a mistake. See Eira Ruben, John Austin's Political Pamphlets
1824 1859, in PERSPECTIVES IN JURISPRUDENCE 20 (Elspeth Attwooll ed., 1977) (demonstrating
Austin's conservatism).
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difference that accounts for their divergent attitudes to legal theory. In one
of his early critiques of Blackstone, Bentham distinguished between the
"expositor," the scholar who described what the law is, and the "censor,"
who focused on assessing the law.84 Bentham was always a censor and
engaged in theoretical abstract work as necessary groundwork for his
practical plans for reform. By contrast, Austin envisaged jurisprudence as
the study of positive law, and much of his work was concerned with an
analysis and clarification of concepts important for understanding what
law is. As Mill wrote, Austin saw his task as that of "[t]he untying of
intellectual knots."85
It is thus in Austin's work that we see a transition from the positivism
of Hobbes and Bentham to the anti-positivist version of legal positivism
that became predominant in the twentieth century.86 We see an account of
law grounded in observable fact: law is the empirically observed
command of the empirically observed sovereign (the sovereign is simply
the person or group of persons that others are in the habit of obeying but
does not obey others); and his explanation of the way law creates
obligations (that is, his explanation of law's normativity) is grounded in
the fact that violation of legal rules is habitually followed by sanctions.
Methodologically, we can safely ascribe to him a rejection of historicism
and scientism in his analysis of law,87 although he probably has held a less
extreme view on materialism."
Crucially, though, in his work we see the birth of what has come to be
known as "analytic jurisprudence," the analysis of fundamental legal
concepts from "within." 89 For his work was primarily concerned with the
84. See BENTHAM, COMMENT, supra note 68, at 7-8.
85. Mill, Austin on Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 168.
86. One interpreter of Austin's work has argued that he is better understood as an "empiricist", a
view that would be inconsistent with the reading of Austin that I offer in the text. See W.L. MORISON,
JOHN AUSTIN 146-47, 178, 189 (1982); W.L. Morison, Some Myth about Positivism, 68 YALE L.J.
212, 223 (1958). But Morison's reading of Austin has been trenchantly criticized in ROBERT N.
MOLES, DEFINITION AND RULE IN LEGAL THEORY: A REASSESSMENT OF H.L.A. HART AND THE
POSITIVIST TRADITION 30-37 (1987).
87. See Andreas B. Schwarz, John Austin and the German Jurisprudence of His Time, I
POLITICA 178, 187-88 (1934); Mill, Austin on Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 173 (describing
Austin's work as concerned with "stripping off what belongs to the accidental or historical
peculiarities" of a particular legal system in order to identify "universal" elements of law).
88. Unlike Bentham, Austin was a religious believer, and his utilitarianism was not Bentham's
scientific theory; it was the irrefutable claim that God wished people to be happy and that human
institutions were largely an embodiment of God's will. See Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and
Nineteenth-Century English Jurisprudence, 12 J. LEGAL HIST. 58, 63 (1991).
89. On Austin's place in the emergence of analytic jurisprudence see Dan Priel, H.L.A. Hart and
the Invention of Legal Philosophy, 5 PROBLEMA: ANUARIO DE FILOSOFIA Y TEORIA DEL DERECHO 301
(2011). The resemblance between Austin's work and that of twentieth century ordinary language
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delimitation of the domain of positive law and positive morality from the
domain of ethics. Once so distinguished, much of his work was dedicated
to the analysis of concepts like law, sovereignty, command, sanction,
rights, and duties by focusing on their internal relations, not their
empirical reality.
This focus was fertile ground for adoption by twentieth century
philosophers who were preoccupied with conceptual analysis. Indeed,
Hart's influential critique of Austin's work was largely dedicated to
eradicating the remaining scientific elements Austin had taken from
Bentham: he rejected the observable account of obligation in favor of an
alternative that sought to explain it from the internal point of view; and he
introduced the notion of a "rule" as something whose objective reality
cannot be reduced to habits or predictions of behavior, or to the feelings of
certain individuals,90 as an alternative to Austin's observable command.
Hart retained, however, Austin's focus on the analysis of concepts and
their internal relations instead of Bentham's concern with understanding
the legal domain as part of a broader account of reality. It matters little
here whether this critique was based on a misunderstanding of Austin's
work; 91 what matters is how his work was used as part of a major
realignment of legal positivism away from its positivist origins.
3. Alf Ross
The predominance of Hart's work has led to the relative neglect of the
writings of other legal positivists working around the time he was active.
One group of scholars, often grouped together as the "Scandinavian legal
realists," developed ideas that were very different from Hart's in important
respects. As a result of the little interest in their work, there is a tendency
to huddle under this banner a diverse group of scholars, even though there
are important differences between them. To avoid possible
misrepresentation and to keep this discussion to reasonable length, I will
philosophers like Hart led one commentator to argue that Austin could count as one. See Alan R.
White, Austin as a Philosophical Analyst, 64 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 379
(1978); but see Gerard Maher, Analytical Philosophy andAustin's Philosophy ofLaw, 64 ARCHIV FOR
RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 401 (1978) (challenging this view).
90. See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at 57, 88, 138.
91. See MOLES, supra note 86, at 16-30, 42-80 (claiming that Hart misunderstood Austin's
aims). Although Moles makes some important points, I think he overstates his case in his zeal to
rehabilitate Austin.
92. For those differences see Stig Jorgensen, Scandinavian Legal Philosophy, 9 RECHTSTHEORIE
BEIHEFT 289 (1986); Jacob W.F. Sundberg, Scandinavian Unrealism: Co-Report on Scandinavian
Legal Philosophy, 9 RECHTSTHEORIE BEIHEFT 305 (1986).
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only discuss here the work of Alf Ross, a Danish legal theorist, who is
probably the best known scholar in this group.
Ross's work is important for trying to maintain and amplify the
connection between positivism and legal positivism and in this way further
develop the approach found in Bentham's work. Indeed, in Ross's work
one finds some of the clearest links between the two views. Legal
positivism, he said, is not just a substantive thesis about the relation
between law and morality:
[It is also] a doctrine pertaining to the theory or methodology of
legal science. It asserts the possibility of establishing the existence
and describing the content of the law of a certain country at a
certain time in purely factual, empirical terms based on the
observation and interpretation of social facts (human behaviour and
attitudes).93
For Ross this meant that his "realist jurisprudence" was based on "the
desire to understand the cognition of law in conformity with the ideas of
the nature, problems and method of science as worked out by modern
empiricist philosophy" because "[t]here is only one world and one
cognition."94 This meant that, just like Bentham, Ross sought to clear the
discussion from what he took to be meaningless legal talk that "bear[s] a
considerable structural resemblance to primitive magic thought concerning
the invocation of supernatural powers which in turn are converted into
factual effects." 95 The magic involved the introduction of "imaginary
rights" "between the juristic fact and the legal consequence."96
Ross's theory of law rejected all that and represented a conscious effort
to explain legal phenomena and their normative force in terms of empirical
facts. He translated the notion of valid law to the empirically testable
notion of the predicted future behavior of legal officials.97 Along similar
93. Alf Ross, Validity and the Conflict between Legal Positivism and Natural Law, in
NORMATIVITY AND NORMS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KELSENTAN THEMES 147, 149 (Stanley L.
Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski Paulson eds., 1998) [hereinafter Ross, Validity].
94. ALF Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 67 (1959) [hereinafter Ross, LAW AND JUSTICE]; see also
id. at 25 ("[Philosophy] is no theory at all, but a method. This method is logical analysis. Philosophy is
the logic of science, and its subject the language of science.").
95. See Alf Ross, Tu-Tu, 70 HARv. L. REv. 812, 818 (1957). Possibly inspired by Horace Miner,
Body Ritual among the Nacirema, 58 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 503 (1956), Ross's essay started with a
recounting of the strange traditions of a tribe called Noit-cif (get it?) for the sake of revealing the
fictional nature of much of legal discourse, and the way in which it could be translated into meaningful
language by focusing on the legal consequences of legal rules.
96. Ross, supra note 95, at 818.
97. Ross, LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 39-44; Ross, Validity, supra note 93, at 161.
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lines he argued that law's normativity could not be explained by recourse
to morality, for morality was nothing but an expression of an individual's
pro- or con-attitude: as he put it "[to invoke justice is the same thing as
banging on the table: an emotional expression which turns one's demand
into an absolute postulate."98 Instead, the normativity of law was to be
explained in empirical terms. While he rejected the idea that the law could
be explained in purely behavioral terms, he believed the explanation had to
combine empirical observation of behavior with an investigation into the
psychological attitudes that accompany legal rule-following. 99 This may
sound rather similar to Hart's "internal point of view," but, unlike Hart,
Ross emphasized the feeling of being bound by a rule, something he took
to be a measurable fact that distinguishes law from a robber's demand. 00
It should be clear from what has already been said that history played a
minor role in the development of Ross's ideas. In his analysis of
competing theories, he considered whether historical jurisprudence could
be understood as an attempt at "empirical legal-sociological theory of the
dependence of law on the community"-but concluded that it could not
because it "has nothing to do with the causality of nature,"101 and, as such,
it was nothing but discredited natural law in disguise. 102
4. Hans Kelsen
We already see that the suggestion that there is no connection between
positivism and legal positivism is the result of a narrow focus on a small
group of legal theorists whose views are in no way representative of the
views of many legal positivists. To conclude this Part it is worth
considering the unusual work of Hans Kelsen. Though Kelsen spent much
of his career in the United States, his ideas developed in a philosophical
environment quite different from what he found in there. Equally
important, his jurisprudential ideas were rooted in the civil law tradition,
and are therefore not always easy to translate to common law concepts
more familiar to most Anglophone legal philosophers. 103 Moreover, his
98. Ross, LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 94, at274.
99. Id. at 37, 73-74; ALF Ross, DIRECTIVES AND NORMS 87 (1968) ("Not any disagreeable
reaction is a sanction. The notion of a sanction is intimately connected with the feeling of disapproval.
A merely external record of behaviour must lead to unacceptable results, by abstracting from the
meaning of the reaction and its mental background.").
100. Id. at 93, 99.
101. Ross, LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 346.
102. Id. at 249-52.
103. Cf Dan Priel, Is There One Right Answer to the Question of the Nature of Law?, in THE
NATURE OF LAW: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES (W.J. Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds.,
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work often built upon and discussed the work of earlier European scholars
who are virtually unknown in the English-speaking world. It is probably
for this reason that his work, which continues to have considerable
influence to this day in civil law countries, is not as discussed in Anglo-
American circles. Nonetheless, he is widely considered one of the
twentieth century's foremost legal positivists, and has advanced a
strikingly original version of legal positivism.
At the same time, Kelsen was also a positivist, and a rather extreme
one at that. And yet he is in a way an outlier in this group of positivist
legal positivists, for he reached radically different conclusions than all the
other legal positivists discussed in this Section. Because of the
distinctiveness of his view, it is worth discussing it at somewhat greater
length. Importantly, as I will try to show, Kelsen's commitment to
positivism is crucial for understanding his unusual jurisprudential views.
Kelsen was clearly a materialist who believed that the rejection of
"metaphysical dualism" came about "through the advance of empirical
science," which gives people "the courage to discard the realm of the
transcendent."1 04 Gone from this picture is any sense of morality and
religion beyond that of a cultural attitude of a particular group. 05 In a
short but revealing comment on the impact of scientific inquiry on
questions of value, he said:
True science . . . cannot but destroy the illusion that judgments of
value can be derived from cognition of reality or, what amounts to
the same, that values are immanent in the reality which is the object
of scientific study. The view that value is immanent in reality is a
characteristic feature of a metaphysical-religious (and this means
non-scientific) interpretation of nature and society. It necessarily
forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1835982, at 20.
104. Hans Kelsen, Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism, in GENERAL THEORY OF LAW
AND STATE 389, 433 (Wolfgang Herbert Kraus trans., 1945) [hereinafter Kelsen, Natural Law,
Doctrine]. But he immediately expresses a neo-Kantian view inconsistent with logical positivism. See
id at 433-34.
105. See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, What is Justice?, in WHAT IS JUSTICE?: JUSTICE, LAW, AND POLITICS
IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE 1, 21 (1957) ("If the history of human thought proves anything, it is the
futility of the attempt to establish, in the way of rational considerations, an absolutely correct standard
of human behavior as the only just one . . . . [and that] only relative values are accessible to human
reason . . . ."); id. at 20 ("Norms prescribing human behavior can emanate only from human will, not
from human reason . . . ."). Another formulation of this idea is his claim that his pure theory cannot
answer questions about justice, because as "a science," it cannot answer questions that "cannot be
answered scientifically at all," as "judgment[s] of value [are] determined by emotional factors and
therefore subjective in character . . . ." Kelsen, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 20, at 45.
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implies the assumption that both are the creation of God as the
personification of the absolute good.0o
This implied that natural law was wrong because it could not survive the
trial at what Kelsen called the "tribunal of science." 0 7 By contrast, the
right theory was based on the view that "positive law is taken solely as a
human product, and a natural order inaccessible to human cognition is in
no wise considered as necessary for its justification."108
Kelsen did not deny that it is possible to explain human relations in
terms of natural science, that is, in causal terms. He himself explained the
resurgence of natural law theory as the result of the events that took place
in the early twentieth century and the desire to attain some sense of
stability that he associated with the absolute order of value presupposed by
natural law theory.109 But none of this had any bearing on an explanation
of what law actually was. For this end one had to turn to the normative
science he created. 0
His theory was interested in human relations only to the extent that
they are constituted by law."' The resulting account is a "closed"
theoretical construct in which, as Kelsen was fond of saying, "law governs
its own creation."' 2 This is the idea with which Kelsen also explains how
Kelsen sought to explain the normativity of law, the sense in which law
creates obligations. As we have seen, many positivists tried to show that
there is something in the world that could ground law's normativity. But
Kelsen thought this solution impossible: "An 'ought' must always be
deduced from another 'ought'; it never follows from a mere 'is'." His
answer therefore depended on the presupposition of a normative domain.
Kelsen posited a hierarchical structure in which each norm is validated by
a norm higher up the normative scale: bylaws validated by statutes, and
106. Hans Kelsen, Science and Politics, 45 AM. POL. SC. REv. 641, 648 (1951) [hereinafter
Kelsen, Science and Politics].
107. Hans Kelsen, The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of Science, 2 W. POL. Q. 481,
482 85, 501 (1949) [hereinafter Kelsen, Tribunal ofScience]; Kelsen, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra
note 20, at 47-48.
108. Kelsen, Natural Law Doctrine, supra note 104, at 435.
109. Id. at 445.
110. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 75-76 (Max Knight trans., 1970) (2d ed. 1960). For
this reason Kelsen criticized Comte's positivism. See Kelsen, Tribunal of Science, supra note 107, at
501-02.
111. KELSEN, supra note I 10, at 70.
112. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 63 (Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., Claredon Press 1992) (1934) [hereinafter KELSEN,
PROBLEMS].
113. Hans Kelsen, Value Judgments in the Science of Law, 7 J. Soc. PHIL. & JuRis. 312, 324
(1942).
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statutes by the constitution. But this structure by itself still misses the
crucial ingredient that turns words written on a piece of paper into laws
that have normative force. Kelsen's solution to this challenge was to posit
what he called the "Basic Norm," which "allows legal cognition to supply
a meaningful interpretation of the legal material [and which] ultimately ...
guarantees this complex of norms as an order."1 14
The Basic Norm is an essential part of Kelsen's theory, which he called
the "pure theory of law." It is pure, among other reasons, because it does
not try to explain the normativity of law by appeal to any social fact. The
Basic Norm is a theoretical presupposition necessary to explain the
normative aspect of law, but the Basic Norm itself is not explained by
reference to people's beliefs that there is a legal norm in existence or their
feelings of being under obligation. Such beliefs and feelings may exist, but
these are sociological or psychological facts about individuals (and as such
a matter of "is") and therefore incapable of explaining the normative
aspect of law. A scientific approach, which is what Kelsen was seeking,
can only explain law as a hypothetical presupposition observed by a "legal
scientist" standing outside the practice.115 The presupposition guarantees
that the normativity of law is not dependent on-indeed it is oblivious
to-any empirical fact. As he put it, his work was "describing human
behavior; but it does not describe it as it takes place as cause and effect in
natural reality."' 16
It follows that for Kelsen there is a fundamental difference between
natural science and normative science. The former deals exclusively with
the domain of facts, and its object is the discovery of the laws of nature,
which are governed by causation; the latter exists purely in the domain of
norms, a domain that has no room in it for any facts (including no facts
about beliefs or attitudes) and is governed by a relation Kelsen called
"imputation."'" In the same way that in the domain of facts causation is
what ties causes and effects, in the normative domain imputation is the
relation between a norm and what ought to happen, which is different from
114. Kelsen, Natural Law Doctrine, supra note 104, at 406-07.
115. Kelsen, Science and Politics, supra note 106, at 650-51.
116. Id. at 651. Marmor is thus wrong to say that Kelsen "clearly recognized" the internal point of
view "as crucial to any account of a normative system .... " MARMOR, supra note 9, at 54; id. at 23-
24. The essence of Kelsen's pure theory was the rejection of any links with "psychology and biology,
... ethics and theology." KELSEN, PROBLEMS, supra note 112, at 8.
117. KELSEN, supra note 110, at 76, 86. One problem with natural law theories according to
Kelsen was that they sought to explain law in terms of causation, "where cause and effect are
connected by the will of a divine creator." Id. at 77. See generally Hans Kelsen, Causality and
Imputation, 61 ETHICS 1 (1950).
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what is likely to happen (as many legal norms are not adequately enforced)
and from what should happen (as this only reflects a natural fact about
people's preferences).
All this superficially resembles the work of the logical positivists, but
in fact it represents an inversion of their ideas.'" The logical positivists'
sharp distinction between the domain of science and the domain of
philosophy looks a bit like Kelsen's distinction between the domain of
empirical investigation on law and the domain of legal norm. But while
Kelsen seems to have been content with maintaining jurisprudence as the
separate domain of pure norm, the concern of the logical positivists
writing on human behavior was with the establishment of a unified science
in which, ultimately, the complete description of human behavior would
be "framed in the spirit of contemporary physics, e.g., a behavioristic
description."' 19 Within such an account, Kelsen's separation between the
domain of fact and the domain of norm is completely untenable. The
contrast between the two approaches is evident, for example, in the way
Otto Neurath, a prominent logical positivist, reacted to Kelsen's theory. As
Neurath put it, Kelsen's error was his failure to recognize that within a
unified science, ethics and jurisprudence "cannot maintain their
independence." 20
It is this insistence on the independence of jurisprudence's that helps
explain why so many have found Kelsen's ideas so unhelpful, and, quite
frankly, so strange: Kelsen was single-mindedly determined that the task
of jurisprudence is not to explain law as a social phenomenon. Though he
shared both his positivism and his legal positivism with many others, his
understanding of these ideas distinguishes his views from almost all other
legal theorists, at least within the Anglo-American tradition.
118. This may explain why Alf Ross, who, as we have seen, quite explicitly followed the logical
positivists in his work on law, called Kelsen a "quasi-[legal-]positivist." Ross, Validity, supra note 93,
at 159-60; cf ALF Ross, TOWARDS A REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICISM OF THE DUALISM IN
LAw 44 (1946).
119. Otto Neurath, Sociology and Physicalism, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM, supra note 27, at 282,286
(originally published 1931). See generally Michael Friedman, The Re-Evaluation of Logical
Positivism, 88 J. PHIL. 505 (1991) (outlining the philosophical ideas of the logical positivists and
rejecting the claim that they sought to explain the foundations of science in logic).
120. Neurath, supra note 119, at 309. See also similar comments on Kelsen's work in VON MISES,
supra note 27, at 332, 396 n.2. Interestingly, Neurath also added another bit of criticism that sounds as
though it could have come from the mouth of any legal realist: "No special discipline . . . is required to
test the logical compatibility of the rules for the administration of a hospital. What one wishes to know
is how the joint operation of certain measures affects the standard of health, so that one may act
accordingly." Neurath, supra note 119, at 308.
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B. Anti-Positivist Legal Positivism
The discussion so far has sought to show that the rise of legal
positivism is related to the rise of positivism. The two often reflect similar
underlying attitudes about the world and about the right methods for
explaining phenomena in it. However, since the second part of the
nineteenth century, and especially since Hart's work in the 1960s, by far
the more popular strand within legal positivism has been anti-positivistic.
There can be little doubt that the prominence of this approach was in part a
reaction to growing suspicion of science and the potential pitfalls of
applying scientific method to the study of humans. Especially in the period
following World War II, memory of the pseudoscience used to justify
Nazi racial laws was still fresh, and fears of nuclear disaster during the
Cold War years was on many people's minds. What made Gustav
Radbruch cross the lines from legal positivism to natural law,' 2 1 may have
also been instrumental to the growing divergence between positivism and
legal positivism. Moreover, those who did look to the leading scientific
approach to psychology of that age, behaviorism and Freudian
psychoanalysis, had good reasons to doubt the validity of both. What is
now known as the cognitive revolution in psychology was only beginning
to take shape around that time, and there was not much in the work of
psychologists that seemed very helpful for understanding the complex
human interactions one finds in law and morality.12 2 It was thus not
121. Radbruch was a German legal philosopher, who was a legal positivist but switched sides to
natural law after World War II blaming the prevalence of legal positivist ideas on the little resistance
among lawyers to Nazi ideology. On Radbruch and his conversion see Lon L. Fuller, American Legal
Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 481-85 (1954) (book review). On the impact of
what were perceived to be the scientistic excesses of the legal realists on the demise of legal realism
see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND
THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 162-72 (1973).
122. Psychology at the time was largely dominated by behaviorism and much experimental testing
seemed focused on observed bodily reaction to external stimuli. See DANIEL NETTLE, HAPPINESS: THE
SCIENCE BEHIND YOUR SMILE 8-9 (2005) ("In the mid-twentieth century, psychologists were much
more at home discussing rates of eye-blinking than love or joy . . . . Indeed, the folk psychology of
ordinary conversation ... was thought of by professionals as simply bad psychology . . . ."); STEVEN
PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 84 (1997). This may have made it more difficult to see the relevance
of psychology to law. The cognitive revolution that took place in the late 1950s has radically changed
all that. See George A. Miller, The Cognitive Revolution: A Historical Perspective, 7 TRENDS IN
COGNITIVE Sc. 141 (2003). For criticism of Hart for ignoring its impact see John Mikhail, "Plucking
the Mask of Mystery from Its Face ": Jurisprudence and H L.A. Hart, 95 GEO. L.J. 733, 751-57 (2007)
(reviewing LACEY, supra note 18). Mikhail expresses puzzlement how Hart, despite his obvious
interest in language, did not take interest in the breakthroughs in psychology and linguistics that took
place at the time. Id. at 755. Part of the answer is provided by this essay: Hart was interested in
language for its role in providing an anti-positivist, humanistic understanding of human action. From
this perspective cognitive psychology probably seemed not very different from behaviorism.
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unreasonable to think that science had reached its limits as far as the
explanation of human behavior was concerned.
In this Part I examine the methodological foundations of the work of
the best known legal positivists of this period and argue that their ideas
must be understood, at least in part, as a reaction to these developments.
1. HL.A. Hart
Hart was a moral skeptic of sorts: his brief excursion into moral
philosophy in The Concept of Law sought to give a "natural history" of
morality that showed it to be premised on certain contingent facts,
minimalist in content and "positivist" in outlook. 23 Though he never
wrote much on the topic, Hart was clearly sympathethic to skeptical
metaethical views when, later in his life, he had occasion to review three
books expressing such ideas.124 In his jurisprudential work, Hart was
concerned to challenge theories based in "obscure metaphysics," and in
particular he criticized natural law theories for their foundation in "much
metaphysics which few could now accept."' 25
Hart's views, then, have some links to positivism. He sought to provide
an account of law grounded in facts, although his focus was on the facts of
legal practice, something he thought he could explain without engaging in
deep metaphysical questions of the sort that explicitly ground the work of
Hobbes and Bentham. His path to understanding law gave very little place
to history. It is true that he had a story to tell about the emergence of the
legal system, but it was more a thought experiment than a historical
account. Fundamentally, Hart saw his project as an attempt to provide a
"general" description of what makes something into law in all times and
places,126 and this does not sit well with too much attention to the
contingencies of history.
123. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at 191-92; see also Danny Priel, Were the Legal
Realists Legal Positivists?, 27 LAw & PHIL. 309, 331-32 & n.48 (2008), although I may have
exaggerated Hart's positivism there.
124. See H.L.A. Hart, Morality and Realiy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 9 March 1978 (reviewing GILBERT
HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (1977) and J.L. MACKIE,
ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONGS (1977)); H.L.A. Hart, Who Can Tell Right from Wrong?,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 17 July 1986 (reviewing WILLIAMS, ETHICS, supra note 5).
125. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at 188; id. at 84.
126. Id at 239-44. Early on in the book Hart admitted his account was "unhistorical." Id at 17;
see also supra note 9 and accompanying text. For a critique of the lack of historical sense in this
approach, see Morton J. Horwitz, 'Why Is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical?', 17 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 551 (1997).
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While Hart was a positivist in these senses, in other respects that have
proven much more influential he rejected positivism. Hart was, at least for
a while, a practitioner of ordinary language philosophy, and many of his
earlier (and still most widely read) works were, to varying degrees,
committed to its methodology. Frequently maligned these days as an
attempt to solve metaphysical puzzles by attention to the way people use
language, ordinary language philosophy is better understood as an attempt
to offer a humanistic alternative to the scientism of the logical positivists.
Ultimately, what the ordinary language philosophers sought was an
affirmation of the validity of separate "human sciences" alongside the
"natural sciences." And it is this commitment that runs throughout Hart's
work. In a lecture he delivered in 1958 he said that one should avoid
"disputable philosophy" when one could find the answer to one's puzzles
in "plain speech."'127 And as late as 1983, when Hart summarized his
philosophical position in an introduction to a collection of his essays, he
was still sympathetic to what he called "linguistic philosophy,"1 28 an
approach that, as von Wright put it, is "intrinsically disposed against
positivism." 129
The reason for Hart's affinity with the ordinary language approach is
essentially the same reason he was critical of certain aspects of positivism.
Hart believed that positivism could not adequately explain human
practices. In the course of discussing the work of Alf Ross he wrote "there
is much that is questionable, indeed blinding, in the attempt to force the
analysis of legal concepts or of any rules into the framework adapted for
the empirical sciences.",,13o Some twenty-five years later he expressed this
view even less equivocally, saying that for understanding rule-governed
human behavior "the methodology of the empirical sciences is useless."' 3'
Hart's doubts about the application of scientific methods to this domain
32
extended also to social sciences like sociology or psychology.13 Hart
described his book The Concept of Law as not just an "essay in analytical
jurisprudence," but also "an essay in descriptive sociology." The reason
127. HART, ESSAYS, supra note 8, at 78.
128. Id. at 2-4.
129. GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING 9 (1971).
130. HART, ESSAYS, supra note 8, at 162.
131. Id. at 13.
132. See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, 193, where he rather disparagingly calls
psychology and sociology "still young sciences. . . ." See also Hart Intervieived, supra note 18, at 289
("I was terribly mistrustful of sociology in general. That's an Oxford disease .. ); see also Dan Priel,
Jurisprudence and Psychology, in NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 77, 79-81 (Maksymilian del
Mar ed., 2011) (describing a skeptical attitude among Hart and his colleagues towards psychology).
133. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at vi.
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why so many readers found this claim surprising is because there is so
little in the book that looks like sociology. But I think the phrase captures
something significant about the book: it represented what Hart thought
sociology should look like. It was descriptive in the sense that it sought to
give a politically neutral account of the nature of law, and it was
sociology, indeed good sociology, exactly because it did not attempt to
emulate the methods of the natural sciences (external investigation), their
language (explanation by means of general laws that govern human
behavior), or their goals (making testable predictions).
The right approach to sociology had to take seriously the "internal
point of view":134 free from any obscure metaphysics on the one hand and
resolutely not following the methodology of the empirical sciences on the
other, this approach relied on the examination of language. In The Concept
of Law Hart quoted J.L. Austin's explanation of the importance of
attending to language, that by focusing on language "we 'are looking not
merely at words . . . but at the realities we use words to talk about. We are
using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of the
phenomena.' 13 5 This sentence is revealing not just of a methodological
technique. It also gives us a clue as to the aims of such philosophy, which
are radically different from those set by the positivists: it is not to examine
which part of legal discourse is fictional and which part is real, but rather
to explain the social reality constituted by discourse. It follows that
language is something that by definition cannot be mistaken. Linguistic
philosophy, in other words, was for Hart sociology properly done. This is
a decidedly anti-positivistic idea.136
2. Joseph Raz
Hart's ideas on internal explanation have been further developed in a
more robust and rigorous treatment of practical reasoning in a series of
influential works written by Joseph Raz in the 1970s and 1980s. Focusing
on reasons as the central ingredient for understanding rational action
allowed Raz to largely ignore scientific explanations of action. In this way,
Raz's position is similar to that of Hart, except that Raz was, if anything,
even more forthright in rejecting the few remnants of positivism that Hart
134. Id. at 88-91.
135. Id. at 14 (quoting J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 1, 8
(1956)). The same quote appears also in HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at vi.
136. My views on Hart's brand of positivism accord with those in Brendan Edgeworth, Legal
Positivism and the Philosophy of Language: A Critique of H. L.A. Hart's 'Descriptive Sociology', 6
LEGAL STUD. 115, 127 28 (1986).
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had retained in his work. In the course of discussing Hart's work, Raz has
claimed that its least successful aspects "resulted from [Hart's] adherence
to naturalism and to empiricist epistemology, and his rejection of
evaluative objectivity."13 For his part, Raz has argued that normativity
consists in being related to reasons for belief, action, moods and so on, 38
and his account of reasons is strongly anti-materialist. Raz has also
explicitly rejected the positivist perspective that begins with the correct
metaphysical picture of the world and fits humans and their institutions
and practices inside it. His opposite view is that "[m]etaphysical pictures
are, when useful at all, illuminating summaries of central aspects of our
practices. They are, in other words, accountable to our practices, rather
than our practices being accountable to them." 3 9 Correspondingly, Raz
has defended a conception of philosophical inquiry which limits the
philosopher's role to the identification of the necessary features of "our"
concepts,140 and, like Hart, he stresses the importance of understanding
law from the point of view of those who participate in the practice.141 He
thus adopts what I called holism while rejecting (at least as far as
philosophical inquiry is concerned) historicism.
The task of legal philosophy, for Raz, is to clarify from "within" the
way legal practices play a role in the practical reasoning of individuals, to
put them in clearer light and to highlight their important features. This
approach, which seeks to explain human action in terms of practical
reasoning, presupposes human action's "discontinuity with science."142
Legal philosophy built on these foundations does not seek to challenge the
human attitudes that constitute legal practices; it "merely explains the
concept [of law] that exists independently of it." 4 3 Its ultimate aim is to
help people "understand themselves." 44
Thus, even though Raz's emphasis on practical reasoning instead of
Hart's focus on language gives their respective theories somewhat
137. JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND
PRACTICAL REASON 52 (2009) [hereinafter RAz, BETWEEN].
138. JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON: ON THE THEORY OF VALUE AND ACTION 67-68 (1999).
139. RAZ, BETWEEN, supra note 137, at 228.
140. See id., at 95-96.
141. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 170-77 (2d ed. 1990).
142. Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de siecle Ethics: Some Trends, 101 PHIL. REV. 115, 132
(1992).
143. RAZ, BETWEEN, supra note 137, at 85. This is almost identical to Strawson's words quoted in
the text accompanying note 30, supra.
144. JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND
POLITICS 237 (rev. ed. 1995).
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different flavors, what both accept is the distinctness of philosophical
method and its relative autonomy from science.
3. Other Legal Positivists
It is difficult to exaggerate the influence of Hart and Raz on
contemporary legal philosophy, and especially on legal positivism. The
ringing endorsement to the "internal point of view" found in the writings
of contemporary legal philosophers, among both legal positivists and their
opponents, is proof of the long-lasting influence of Hart's anti-scientistic
approach. 145  The mainstream view among contemporary legal
philosophers is that it is the primary task of jurisprudence to give a
descriptively accurate account of the "concept" or "nature" of law, of what
the law is, as distinct from what it should be. On what that nature actually
is these writers have widely divergent views, but in their adoption of the
basic stance of a description from the internal point of view and in their
belief in its ability to provide a substantive, general, account of law, they
seem to adopt the same anti-positivist approach that characterized Hart's
work.
What is particularly interesting is how this work, which received its
first reasonably clear articulation in the late 1950s, has been used to
reinterpret the works of earlier legal philosophers. Hart, for example,
wrote that one of the things that Bentham and Austin were concerned to
show was that "a purely analytical study of legal concepts, a study of the
meaning of the distinctive vocabulary of the law, was as vital to our
understanding of the nature of law as historical or sociological studies." 146
But, as we have seen, at least with regard to Bentham this is clearly a
mistake. At the same time, Hart often criticized earlier legal philosophers
for failing to pay sufficient attention to the way the language of law is
used and for ignoring the way people think about legal practice. 147 This
criticism makes sense only if one assumes that earlier positivists shared
with him the anti-positivist perspective, which, as we have seen, they did
not. If this assumption is abandoned, much of Hart's critique of earlier
incarnations of legal positivism can no longer be taken as a glaring
oversight on part of earlier legal theorists, but rather as a direct implication
145. See, e.g., Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the
Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171 (2006); Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Internal Point
of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1157 (2006); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Obligations and the
Internal Aspect ofRules, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229 (2006).
146. HART, ESSAYS, supra note 8, at 57.
147. See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at 36-38, 82-83, 88-89, 102-03, 138.
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of their positivist outlook. Hart's failure to address the methodological
background of this position renders his criticism of their position rather
superficial and lacking in theoretical backing. Indeed, if we take Hobbes's
and Bentham's positivism seriously, we have reason to think that Hart did
not really address their views. More generally, we have then reason to
doubt the traditional story about the development of legal positivism from
the supposedly simple theory of law offered by Hobbes to the more
sophisticated accounts found in the work of contemporary legal
positivists.148
Distinguishing the two strands of legal positivism also allows us to
assess their fates. Contrary to first impressions one would get from
examining contemporary work, I believe it is the positivist strand of legal
positivism that has been a success, whereas the anti-positivist one has been
a rather dismal failure. True, many today take Hart's criticisms of
positivism to be decisive. But the positivist strand is alive and well,
outside the narrow confines of analytic legal philosophy. In more and
more areas, we see the explanatory power of the external point of view,
especially in the work of legal economists and political scientists who,
many of them possibly without fully appreciating just how much, have
been following Bentham's lead.149
By contrast, it is becoming increasingly clear that the attempt to recast
legal philosophy as the enterprise of describing the "concept" of "nature"
of law has not been a success. Instead of the internal point of view
focusing the theorists' attention to the important aspects of law, it seems to
have drawn participants into an increasingly insular debate that has not
been particularly helpful in helping people understand themselves.5 o
III. WERE THE LEGAL REALISTS POSITIVISTS?
So far I have shown how examining the relationship between
positivism and legal positivism allows us to understand better the different
views of different legal positivists and the historical development of this
148. See Priel, supra note 10, for my attempt to a brief retelling of the emergence of contemporary
legal positivism from the rather different views of Hobbes and Bentham; cf James Boyle, Thomas
Hobbes and the Invented Tradition ofPositivism: Reflections on Language, Power, and Essentialism,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 383, 408-19 (1987).
149. Cf Richard A. Posner, Bentham 's Influence on the Law and Economics Movement, 51
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 425 (1998).
150. For my detailed arguments as to why this approach is indefensible see Danny Priel, The
Boundaries of Law and the Purpose of Legal Philosophy, 27 LAW & PHIL. 643 (2008); Dan Priel,
Description and Evaluation in Jurisprudence, 29 LAW & PHIL. 633 (2010).
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idea. But such concerns were not confined only to analytic legal
philosophers. Rather, it is a matter of concern for any theorist concerned
with the explanation of human behavior. I wish to demonstrate this claim
by examining the work of another group of legal theorists, the legal
realists, by showing how similar concerns and tensions are found in their
work. A further reason for focusing on their work in this context is Brian
Leiter's claim that the legal realists are best understood both as
"naturalists" (which roughly corresponds to what I called positivists) and
as legal positivists. Given what I have said so far, we must ask in
response: "which legal positivists?" As we shall see, there are in fact two
camps among the legal realists-one positivist, the other anti-positivist. I
will then argue that, though the positivist strand of legal positivism has
obvious links with the legal positivism of Bentham, it is hard to find
important links between it and contemporary legal positivism. This should
not be very surprising when considered alongside my claim that
contemporary legal positivists are anti-positivist; but I will then argue that
even the anti-positivist strand of legal realism bears no important
connections with contemporary legal positivism.
A. Positivist Legal Realists
Walter Wheeler Cook, Underhill Moore, Hessel Yntema, and Herman
Oliphant are among the best known realists, and they all believed that (to
use Llewellyn's phrase) the "next step" in legal scholarship is to adopt the
method of the social sciences, which themselves should follow the steps of
the natural sciences.152 Cook was a self-styled behaviorist who "proposed,
instead of following the a priori method, to adopt the procedure which has
proved so fruitful in other fields of science, viz. to observe concrete
phenomena first and to form generalizations afterwards."' 5 ' Similarly,
151. Leiter advanced this view in a series of articles now mostly collected in BRIAN LEITER,
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY (2007). For my earlier doubts about this claim see Priel, supra note 123. The discussion
in the text below accompanies and amplifies this article, although the arguments are different. Whereas
in my previous discussion I focused on the substantive philosophical views of legal positivists and
legal realists, here the treatment focuses more on the legal realists' and legal positivists'
methodological presuppositions.
152. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-60, at 20 (1986).
153. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
457, 460 (1924); see also Walter Wheeler Cook, The Present Status of the "Lack of Mutuality" Rule,
36 YALE L.J. 897, 897-900 (1927); cf Walter Wheeler Cook, A Scientific Approach to the Study of
Law, in ESSAYS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE IN HONOR OF WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY 201 (James
Mabry Mathews & James Hart eds., 1937) (demonstrating by a series of analogies to scientific inquiry
how the law might be improved).
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Underhill Moore began one of his articles writing that it "lies within the
province of jurisprudence" but also "within the field of behavioristic
psychology." 154 These scholars sought to turn jurisprudential questions
into psychological ones by adopting the tools of experimental
psychology. 55
Even those less committed to behaviorism have argued that legal
research should follow the social sciences in aiming to formulate general
laws, "asserting invariant, or almost invariant relationships among the
facts in its specific field,"156 and that it should adopt the methods of the
social sciences. Many of the legal realists were unabashed logical
positivists.' 5  In some of Felix Cohen's most influential work, for
example, he followed the early work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the
logical positivists of the Vienna Circle to argue that many legal concepts
were "nonsense," because there was nothing in the world to which they
referred. 58
These attitudes were not confined just to theory. Many legal realists,
with various degrees of success, tried to both revolutionize the way law is
studied and taught as well as the way the law is practiced by aligning it
with the rest of the social sciences.' 59 Their skepticism regarding the role
of legal rules in the legal decision-making process and their emphasis on
the influence of factors such as the identities of the parties and the
biographical background of the judge on the outcome of casesi1o makes
154. Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal
Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1943); see also Underhill Moore, Rational Basis for Legal Institutions, 23
COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1923).
155. Even realists who did not follow the work of the logical positivists suggested experiments to
examine the working of the courts. See, e.g., Hessel E. Yntema, Legal Science and Reform, 34 COLUM.
L. REV. 207, 225 (1934); seealso Hessel E. Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM.
L. REV. 925 (1931).
156. Huntington Cairns, Law, as a Social Science, 2 PHIL. SC. 484, 489 (1935); see also EDWARD
STEVENS ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS 319-20 (1935) ("[N]othing could be more seriously
designed for an eventual reform of the legal institution than a science ofjurisprudence which insists
upon describing law in naturalistic terms.").
157. See HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, THE THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE 74-75, 79-81 (1941); Felix S.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 823-27
(1935) [hereinafter Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense]; Underhill Moore's contribution to MY
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 201, 203-04 (1941) [hereinafter MY
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW]; cf Herman Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and Value-Judgments, 10 TEX. L. REV.
127,135-39 (1932).
158. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 157, passim; see also Cohen, Ethical Basis,
supra note 32, at 201-02, 203 n.9 (rejecting historicist and evolutionary arguments).
159. See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1995); S.N. Verdun-Jones, Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema: The Scientific Wing ofAmerican
Legal Realism (pts. I & 2), 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 249 (1979).
160. See, for example, Joseph Walter Bingham's contribution to MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra
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sense from a positivist perspective, which gives little weight to legal
language in understanding reality. Their project was, in other words, an
attempt to break the closed boundaries of legal discourse and connect it
with reality. This meant turning the study of law into a social science by
testing hypotheses about the operation of the law by examining statistical
evidence. These studies were often the subject of ridicule and criticism to
future generations, 16 1 but whether or not they were successful, they clearly
reflected a positivist outlook.
B. Anti-Positivist Legal Realists
At the same time, there were other famous legal realists who
emphasized the irrational, intuitive, and emotional aspects in humans'
mental life. Naturally, these realists were critical of attempts to use the
methods of the empirical sciences for predicting judicial behavior.16 2 To
the extent that they looked for science, their "science" of choice was
psychoanalysis, which emphasized the unconscious and irrational in the
human mind. For proponents of this view this implied the inapplicability
of traditional scientific methods to human behavior. Jerome Frank, the
most enthusiastic defender of these ideas, has relied on psychoanalytic
ideas to describe lawyers' attachment to formalism,163 underwent
psychoanalytic treatment himself, and has even argued that all judges
should be required to do them same in order for them to recognize their
own prejudices. In his work, he has argued against the possibility (and
desirability) of organizing human affairs using law-like generalizations. 164
note 157, at 7, 21 23. Leiter takes this to be the "core claim" of legal realism. See LEITER, supra note
151,at21-25.
161. "Students often remember realism from colourful stories about funny men who thought
judges [sic] decisions depended on 'hunches' and what they had for breakfast, or who thought the best
way to study law was to sit on park benches counting cars." Stephen Livingstone, Of the Core and the
Penumbra: H.LA. Hart and American Legal Realism, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ORTHODOXY:
QUEEN S UNIVERSITY ESSAYS ON H.L.A. HART 147, 147 (Philip Leith & Peter Ingram eds., 1988);
Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 401 (1956)
[hereinafter Llewellyn, Legal Research]; Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal
Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 337 (1988).
162. See Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1330-33 (1947) (rejecting
the very idea of "social science," and the hopes of applying scientific method to the law); see also
Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part Two: As Through a Glass Darkly, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 233,
254-59 (1931). In return, the positivist legal realists were equally skeptical of these realists' ideas. See,
e.g., Felix S. Cohen, The Problems ofa Functional Jurisprudence, I MOD. L. REV. 5, 13 (1937).
163. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 13-21, 69 75 (1930).
164. See Charles L. Barzun, Jerome Frank and the Modern Mind, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1127, 1140-
44 (2010). Frank's solution was the cultivation of what he called the "scientific spirit." FRANK, supra
note 163, at 98. But he meant by this term the exact opposite of what most do when attempting to
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Frank thought such an approach to law ignores the uniqueness of an
irreducibly complex reality, and therefore necessarily leads judges astray.
He sought to counter the scientific tendencies in law by adopting a
humanistic perspective that emphasized the unique particularity of
individual cases.
The most famous other legal realist to have advanced such a view was
Joseph Hutcheson, a federal appellate judge, who famously argued that it
is intuition, whose powers he described in almost mystical terms, that
guides (and should guide) lawyers in finding the right answer to legal
-165questions.
Benjamin Cardozo also deserves mention here. There is some
controversy whether he even belongs among the ranks of the legal
realists,166 because he was not generally recognized as a member of the
group and was skeptical of some of their ideas. Nonetheless, he explicitly
endorsed the prediction theory of legal rules, the most famous of the legal
realists' slogans,167 and he accepted another familiar realist tenet, the idea
that for many proposed legal principles one could easily find an opposite
within the law. His writings on adjudication emphasized the way
psychology challenges accounts of adjudication that describe it as the
application of general rules to particular cases.16 9 For these reasons, his
writings and approach to adjudication can be treated as another example of
the anti-positivist strand within legal realism, especially as his writings
introduce science into the law. See id. at 96-97. For him, the scientific spirit was an adventurous, free-
wheeling inquiry that he thought was the exact opposite of what he found in most scientific inquiry.
See Barzun, supra, at 1158-66.
165. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Lawyer's Law, and the Little, Small Dice, 7 TUL. L. REV. I
(1932); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929) [hereinafter Hutcheson, Judgment Intuitive]; accord Jerome
Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 655-56 (1932).
166. Compare ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 203, 451, 457-58, 575 (1998) (arguing that
Cardozo held moderate legal realist views, despite ambivalent views towards the work of the realists)
with John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1452-53 (1999) (reviewing
KAUFMAN, supra) (arguing Cardozo was a critic of legal realism).
167. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 33-34, 40 (1924); id. at 44 ("We
shall unite in viewing as law that body of principle and dogma which with a reasonable measure of
probability may be predicted as the basis for judgment in pending on in future controversies. When the
prediction reaches a high degree of certainty or assurance, we speak of the law as settled . . . . When
the prediction does not reach so high a standard, we speak of the law as doubtful or uncertain."); id. at
52.
168. Id. at 58-59. See also Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, Jurisprudence, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO: THE CHOICE OF TYCHO BRAHE 7 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947) (offering
a critical but clearly sympathetic assessment of the ideas of the legal realists).
169. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 165-77 (1921).
Id. at 167 (emphasizing the influence on adjudication of "forces [that] are seldom fully in
consciousness").
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exerted considerable influence on the legal realists with the anti-positivist
bent.170
What about the most famous of the legal realists, Karl Llewellyn?
Llewellyn is not easy to pin down, and, as a representative of this group of
scholars, his case shows the difficulties with attempts to associate the legal
realists with a particular view or research methodology. On the one hand,
he clearly did not endorse Frank's more extreme views, and in some of
his writings he clearly thought lawyers could benefit from the input of
social science for providing data that traditional legal methods would
completely miss.172 But it would be a mistake, I think, to cast him in the
positivist side, 73 for he was often skeptical, sometimes even scornful, of
some of the other legal realists' forays into empirical research or jejune
attempts at introducing scientific methods into legal research.174 His
concern with the more scientifically minded realists was not limited to
how they conducted their research, and went to the heart of the efforts to
turn jurisprudence scientific. Llewellyn clearly did not think that value (or
ought) statements could be reduced to fact (or is) statements,17 5 and in his
own work he always remained faithful to the traditional methods of the
law and sought to improve rather than eradicate them. His criticism of
formalism and lawyers' tendency to present law as a system of rules was a
critique of the way people understood how the common law worked, not a
critique of the method itself, which throughout his life he largely defended
by what he thought was a more accurate internal explanation. And
although he no doubt thought the law had many flaws, he believed it was
an important institution for reflecting on, working out, and reinforcing the
values people within a particular community hold.17 6 He was thus one of
the first, at least within the Anglo-American tradition, to explicitly tie the
law of a state to its traditions and culture.177 Correspondingly, in his
170. For Jerome Frank's admiration for Cardozo see KAUFMAN, supra note 166, at 458; see also
Hutcheson, Judgment Intuitive, supra note 165, at 284-85.
171. See K.N. Llewellyn, Legal Illusion, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 82, 85-86 (1931) (reviewing FRANK,
supra note 163).
172. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 1286 (1949) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Social Sciences].
173. For such a view see, for example, HORWITZ, supra note 14, at 191.
174. See Llewellyn, Legal Research, supra note 161, at 400-01; cf K.N. Llewellyn, The Theory of
Legal "Science," 20 N.C. L. REV. 1, 17-18, 22 (1941); K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 36 COLUM. L.
REV. 505 (1936).
175. Compare Llewellyn, Legal Tradition, supra note 37, at 101-03, iwith Walter Wheeler Cook,
The Possibilities of Social Study as a Science, in ESSAYS ON RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,
supra note 37, at 27, 37-47.
176. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 122 (1960).
177. See James Whitman, Note, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn s
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discussion of the impact social science should have on the law he
emphasized the work of those social theorists who sought to identify the
social meaning of particular legal institutions."'
C. Positivism, Legal Positivism and Legal Realism
Brian Leiter has recently called for the adoption of what he termed
"naturalized jurisprudence," an idea with close ties to positivism. He has
also argued that the legal realists were early proponents of this approach.
Though significant for turning legal philosophers' attention to the
significance of the work of the legal realists, Leiter's work remains quite
limited to one twentieth century American movement. The longer
historical view reveals that what many of the legal realists were interested
in was exactly in line with what many before them in the history of
jurisprudence were concerned with, namely to use the best science
available in their day to explain the law.'79 As "science" transformed from
"natural philosophy" to become a distinct discipline, its successes,
prominence, and significance mounted, and jurisprudents began borrowing
scientific ideas, or, rather, trying to align their subject with advances in
science and scientific methodology. These ideas have been, more often
than not, most prominent in the work of writers today associated with the
legal positivist tradition. It is only around the time of Austin-that is,
around the time that the social sciences were born-that jurisprudence
started being associated with legal philosophy. By then, and even more so
in the decades that followed, jurisprudence became the name for the
residual domain of what was left after all other theoretical approaches to
the study of law became independent.
Against this historical development Anglophone jurisprudence of the
last fifty years (ironically, in spite of the dominance of legal positivism)
appears as an aberration. For what is distinctive about it is the almost
uniform rejection of ties with science, indeed for defining itself and its
methodology in opposition to the sciences. Leiter's project of showing the
compatibility of legal positivism (and legal philosophy more generally)
with naturalism is thus reformist only in the present context. When
German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE U. 156 (1987) (describing the origins
of these ideas in nineteenth century, very anti-scientistic, German romanticism).
178. See Llewellyn, Legal Research, supra note 161.
179. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICS IN JUDGING 44-63 (2010). Tamanaha finds many realist-sounding ideas in the generation or
two before the emergence of legal realism. My claim is that all those ideas are found at least as early as
Bentham. See Felix S. Cohen, Book Review, 42 YALE L.J. 1149, 1149-50 (1933).
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considered against the longer history of legal theory (which Leiter does
not discuss), his ideas look much less radical.
On the other side, Leiter's picture of the legal realists as naturalists is
only partially correct, and arguably fails to capture even the views of Karl
Llewellyn, the best-known of the legal realists and probably the one with
the greatest lasting influence. The discussion above also helps identify
both the basis for and the difficulty with the claim that the legal realists
were legal positivists. Exactly because the most important defenders of
contemporary legal positivism have not been positivists, I do not think
legal realists could be counted as legal positivists in the way that term is
understood today. This is true of the positivist legal realists and, although
for different reasons, for the anti-positivist legal realists as well. If we look
first at how members of these respective groups described their views, we
find, for example, Hessel Yntema, among the positivist legal realists,
saying that "the classification of American legal realism in the category of
positivism along with Austin, Kelsen, etc., is so superficial as to border on
the perverse."180 If we compare them to Hart and Raz the differences are
even more pronounced. On the side of anti-positivist group Llewellyn
expressed affinity to a form of natural law.' 8' And he was not alone. Never
shy of a dramatic phrase, Jerome Frank said he "do[es] not understand
how any decent man today can refuse to adopt, as a basis of modern
civilization, the fundamental principles of Natural Law." 182
My claim is not based only on the realists' self-reports. The emergence
of legal positivism as an a priori inquiry about the nature of law or as an
analytic claim about the concept of law (rather than as an empirical
observation or definitional stipulation, as it is in the work of earlier legal
positivists) was grounded in a theoretical methodology that was
diametrically opposed to the view that the final arbiter on all matters is
scientific method.
What is more interesting is that, paradoxically, those legal realists who
were themselves anti-positivists were, if anything, even further from
contemporary legal positivism. A central tenet of their arguments was the
rejection of the possibility of giving a clear account of law in terms of
180. Hessel E. Yntema, Jurisprudence on Parade, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1154, 1164 (1941). As
Yntema goes on to say, the legal positivist is mostly interested in questions of "logic and form,"
whereas the legal realists were mostly concerned with the "function, operation, and consequences or,
in other words, the substance, of law." Id.
181. See the quote from Llewellyn, Natural Laiw, supra note 37. See also LLEWELLYN, supra note
176, at 122; cf K.N. Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Laiw, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 207, 211-12
(1934).
182. Jerome Frank, Legal Thinking in Three Dimensions, 1 SYRACUSE L. REv. 9, 17 (1949).
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rules. As a result, there can be little doubt that Llewellyn, for example,
would have found Hart's legal positivism unsatisfactory:
under the traditional approach [to jurisprudence] the bulk of the
subject matter of law is exhausted when the writer has expressed in
words what ought to be done, or, if he is a legal "positivist," when
he has expressed in words what those rules are which in the state he
is discussing are officially accepted as laying down what ought to be
done ("positive law").183
On the other hand, Llewellyn emphasized the extent to which law is not
exhausted by these legal rules, but is influenced by prevalent attitudes,
culture, social norms:
the stuff of official legal rules, official legal concepts, etc., presents
itself under completely different aspects according to the particular
craft-job which is concerned. Thus the judge, the counsellor, the
advocate, the legislator, the policy-shaping administrator, the
administrative subaltern or private, all see and use the official rule-
stuff differently, and the more detailed study of the different crafts,
of their craft-skills, -traditions, -ideals, -organization, -morale,
-recruiting, presses, and presses hard, for attention.18 4
This is inconsistent with legal positivism not simply because of the view
that there is more to legal decision making than legal rules. Legal
positivism of the last fifty years assumed that it is possible and important
to articulate clearly what separates law from other normative domains.'
But where legal positivists analyzed legal practice through its linguistic
manifestations (most importantly, legal decisions) and saw there a
distinction which they thought they could sharpen between the domain of
"law" and other domains which are not law (even if they occasionally
affect the outcome of legal decisions), the anti-positivist legal realists
looked into legal practice, peered into their own minds, and could not see
there any clear distinction between the two. Hutcheson's intuitions were a
combination of legal rules, common sense, social mores, and probably
183. Llewellyn, Legal Tradition, supra note 37, at 95.
184. Llewellyn, Social Sciences, supra note 172, at 1298. Llewellyn's most serious attempt at an
inquiry as the one he described in the text was anthropological and was anti-positivistic in nature. See
KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN
PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
185. See RAZ, BETWEEN, supra note 137, at 199-200; cf Leslie Green, Law and the Causes of
Judicial Decisions (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14/2009, 2009), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=1374608.
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some of the judge's personal prejudices. It was pointless, perhaps even
meaningless, to try to separate "the law" from all the rest.
We can summarize this point in the following way: positivist legal
realists rejected the idea of analyzing law as practical reason because
accepting it was inconsistent with scientific method. By contrast, those
realists who were anti-positivists would have found the model of practical
reason adopted by contemporary legal positivists to be at best incomplete,
and at worst positively misleading, for it gives the impression that
adjudication is a much more rationalistic process than they thought it
actually was. Either way, legal realists would have found the ideas central
to twentieth century legal positivism highly unsatisfactory.
IV. WHAT SHOULD LEGAL PHILOSOPHY BECOME?
I have said before that the anti-positivist stance in recent legal
positivism has been, in part, a reaction to what may have been perceived
as the failures or limits of science of human action. With the passage of
time these worries may have subsided to some degree.186 But I think there
was then, and still is, another reason for philosophers, and particularly
legal philosophers, to resist the temptations of science. For if the social
sciences (and perhaps, in the future, cognitive sciences) could explain
social behavior, the need for legal philosophy, or social philosophy more
generally, might be put in question. On the positivist picture, philosophy
has no substantive role in understanding reality, and, in the extreme case
of the logical positivists, it can only properly deal with tautologies. In this
picture, philosophers are left with the job of explaining why scientific
method is the only available method. But even more moderate versions of
positivism lead to similar conclusions, at least as far as the study of social
phenomena is concerned. Thus, rejecting such views was necessary
(although not sufficient) for recognizing the potential for philosophy to
make a positive contribution to the understanding of law. By adopting an
anti-positivist methodology, legal philosophers could carve for themselves
a unique area of inquiry, one that almost by definition was not in danger of
infiltration by the scientists.
The Hartian solution to this challenge, probably only partially
conscious, has been an attempt to mix the goals of science of an
objectively correct and morally neutral description of law with the
methods of the humanities-not by resorting to empirical testing of
186. They have by no means disappeared. See, e.g., MARMOR, supra note 9, at 33-34; Green,
supra note 185, at 4.
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hypotheses, but rather by trying to understand the role law plays in human
action through introspection. In this way, Hart sought to occupy a
methodological halfway house that would avoid the pitfalls of positivism
but which was, he thought, rigorous enough to provide an objective
description of reality. 87 It steered clear of both the subjectivity of
humanistic "narrative" explanation-in which everyone has his or her own
story and there is no way of telling which is right-and what he
considered to be the explanatory inadequacy of scientific "external"
explanation.
There now seems to be a growing sense among legal philosophers that
this way of occupying the middle ground is indefensible. Though not
couched in these terms, two recent and very different books may be read
as a critique of this view, one urging movement toward the humanities,
while the other calls for a turn to science. Both take their central point all
the way to their title. In Legal Norms and Normativity: An Essay in
Genealogy, Sylvie Delacroix tries to explain how law creates norms. Her
answer, briefly, is that normativity is the result of day-to-day engagement
or confrontation with law's requirements. 88 It is only such "internal"
engagement with the law that can "create" its sense of obligation. For our
purposes, it is interesting that Delacroix, in effect, calls for an even more
anti-positivist stance than Hart's and other contemporary legal positivists.
She does so, first, by rejecting the midway position adopted by many legal
positivists of the observer who can explain and understand law's
normativity by looking at legal phenomena from the perspective of
participants. Law is not made up of rules that a person can recite as though
they apply to her, for such an understanding does not capture the sense in
which these rules are obligating. The "dynamic" reality of law can only be
understood by participants who engage with the law. Second, contrary to
the minimalist role accorded to history in the work of legal positivists like
Hart and Raz, to historically situate jurisprudential questions is, on
Delacroix's account, the only way to adequately address them.
Philosophy, on this view, aims to help people make sense of their lives or
understand themselves, and understand what we are and what we think
requires knowing more about how we related (intellectually) to our
ancestors. 189 The Hartian approach is mistaken because it seeks to describe
187. Cf Mikhail, supra note 122, at 744-45 (describing Hart's tendency to situate his view as a
"mean between extremes").
188. SYLVIE DELACROIX, LEGAL NORMS AND NORMATIVITY: AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY 165
(2006).
189. For a defense of a similar view of philosophy more generally, see WILLIAMS, HuMANISTIC
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the practice as it is understood by those who are part of it while remaining
outside the practice itself. Delacroix argues that the only way of
understanding law's normativity is by being seeing it from within.190
By contrast, Brian Leiter's Naturalizing Jurisprudence is a forceful
appeal to moving jurisprudence in the opposite direction. In Leiter's view,
legal philosophers should adopt materialism, abandon the internal point of
view, and align jurisprudence explicitly with the sciences. As Leiter puts
it, his favored approach to jurisprudence is "'naturalized' because it falls
into place . . . as a chapter of psychology (or anthropology or sociology)"
that will provide "a descriptive/explanatory account of what input ...
produces what output."' 9' More concretely, Leiter has been one of the very
few legal philosophers to countenance the rejection of the methodological
assumption that jurisprudence should be conducted from the internal point
of view, and his examples of what naturalized jurisprudence would look
like are all drawn from the work of political scientists who study judicial
behavior by statistical analysis of their voting patterns. As he
acknowledges, in such studies there is little room for examining judges'
attitudes. 192
Both views seem to be united by the implicit recognition that the
midway position that much twentieth century legal philosophy tried to
occupy does not exist. By contrast, both can point to examples of
successful explanations for their favored methodology. On the one hand,
we often use historical narrative to make sense of much that goes on in our
lives: such narratives are used to explain the eruption of wars, the causes
of economic depressions, and the explanation of doctrinal changes in the
law. More importantly, people often rely on such historical narratives to
explain the sort of obligations they have toward friends, family, or
members of their nation. At the same time, they recognize that these
DISCIPLINE, supra note 5, at 192 99. Cf E.M. Adams, The Mission of Philosophy Today, 31
METAPHILOSOPHY 349, 361 (2000) (advancing an even more radical view according to which
"[s]cience must find its place within a humanistic culture."). Philosophy is not the only discipline that
struggles for a place. Sociology has been similarly pulled in different directions by those on one side
who advocated sociology as a humanistic discipline (see, for example, PETER L. BERGER, INVITATION
TO SOCIOLOGY: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE 186 (1963)) and those on the other who called for it to
be modeled after the natural sciences (see, for example, Donald Black, Dreams of Pure Sociology, 18
Soc. THEORY 343 (2000). This reflects the general difficulty with finding the right methodology for
explaining human behavior.
190. This approach bears close resemblance to Dworkin's. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 13-14, passim (1986). Like Hart, Dworkin employs in this passage the internal point of view,
but unlike Hart Dworkin thinks that this internal perspective is only tenable if one engages in
substantive legal practice. See id. at 78-86.
191. LEITER, supra note 151, at 40.
192. Id. at 134-35; but see id. at 192 (expressing doubts about these studies).
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explanations can be difficult for others to fully understand.' 93 The
explanatory successes of science are widespread and overwhelming, and
with much more data at their disposal, social scientists are able to reach
interesting and often counterintuitive findings about human action and
human nature, even though they are based on purely "external"
observations. In contrast, it is not easy to find many successful examples
of explaining social phenomena by means of a priori reflection.
Interestingly, it may be that both approaches are tenable at the same
time and illuminating in different ways. But the problem is that the attempt
to turn philosophy into these different disciplines may leave no role for the
methods and approaches we traditionally associate with philosophy.
Delacroix's genealogical approach that aims to give philosophy a
substantive role in "creating" normativity through engagement in the
issues that lawyers use to explain their subject matter is in danger of
becoming history 9 4 (or in the case of particular legal questions, of
becoming doctrinal scholarship), and it is unclear whether the positivist
approach favored by Leiter leaves any work left for legal philosophers
once all questions ofjurisprudence are recast as empirical ones.195
Consider first Leiter's claim that "[p]hilosophers, [adopting the
naturalistic] approach, are the abstract and reflective branch of empirical
science, clarifying the contours and extensions of concepts that have been
vindicated by their role in successful explanation and prediction of
empirical phenomena." 96 The problem with this view is that the unique
role Leiter gives for philosophy appears to be part of all scientific
explanation: science is never content with merely gathering of
information. Rather, science is the attempt to organize data in a revealing
and illuminating way.99 In this picture the only substantive role left for the
philosopher seems to be the one suggested by Daniel Dennett, another
philosophical naturalist, who said that "as a philosopher [he is] concerned
193. Cf THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 196-97, 204-05 (1981); Thomas Nagel, Moral
Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 229 31 (1987).
194. Delacroix recognizes this difficulty. See DELACROIX, supra note 188, at 97-99.
195. Leiter acknowledges this challenge. See LEITER, supra note 151, at 184-86. Notice that the
difficulty for someone who adopts this approach is not whether there is value in non-reductive
explanation. This is a matter of some disagreement, but it is not the point. Even if we believe that there
is value in non-reductive explanation (and Leiter seems to hold this view), the question that remains is
whether there is a unique (or, actually, any) role left for any distinctly philosophical explanation of
social phenomena. Id. at 217.
196. Id at 184; accord Brian Leiter, Introduction, in THE FUTURE FOR PHILOSOPHY 1, 3 (Brian
Leiter ed., 2004).
197. See LEITER, supra note 151, at 204-06 (providing Leiter's account of what would count as
good explanation that takes (natural) scientific explanation as its model).
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to establish the possibilities (and rebut claims of impossibility)" and as
such he can "settle for theory sketches instead of full-blown, empirically
confirmed theories." 198 No doubt a philosopher (like anyone else) can offer
her assistance to the scientists and may occasionally be able to offer an
insight that escaped the scientists, perhaps exactly because she may have
broader but less technical knowledge on a wide range of issues that the
specialist scientist may lack.199 But for the most part it looks like the
scientists are perfectly capable of taking care of themselves. Perhaps in the
area of the mind and brain (Dennett's specialty) there is still so much
unknown that there is real need for imaginative philosophers to establish
big-picture "possibilities" instead of working on the nuts and bolts, or
neurons and synapses. But there does not seem to be any mystery of a
similar kind in law, no serious possibilities or impossibilities to be
examined. There is only a contingent social practice to be explained using
the same methods we use for explaining all other phenomena, social or
otherwise. There may be a need for a "philosophy" to explain the reasons
for a positivistic inquiry about law; but within this picture it does not look
as though there are any unique philosophical questions about law. Indeed,
whatever one thinks of the work Leiter suggested as examples of
naturalized jurisprudence, one thing is clear: even by a stretch it cannot be
called "philosophy," and (leaving terminological foibles aside) it does not
look like its practitioners are looking for, or are in need of, philosophers to
assist them in their work.
The problem, then, is that taking Leiter's ideas seriously looks more
like admitting that legal philosophy has completed its historical role as a
unique intellectual endeavor. I do not mean this as a reductio against
Leiter's views. I believe this is a real possibility, and it is one that must be
seriously considered. The archaeology of knowledge is full of the
decaying remains of disciplines that were gobbled up by others, and it may
be that jurisprudence (or, more precisely, analytic jurisprudence) belongs
with them.
Given these limited prospects for philosophy being able to make a real
contribution to scientific inquiry, adopting the alternative humanistic
approach may look more appealing. Consider in this context Bernard
Williams's suggestion that philosophers should abandon their scientistic
aspirations and think of philosophy as a humanistic discipline, concerned
198. DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED41 (1991).
199. Cf Philip Kitcher, A Plea for Science Studies, in A HOUSE BUILT ON SAND: EXPOSING
POSTMODERNIST MYTHS ABOUT SCIENCE 31,33 34 (Noretta Koertge ed., 1998).
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with "how to make the best sense of ourselves and our activities." 200 The
problem is how we move from such programmatic claims to specific
proposals. Williams's examples of humanistic philosophy include
examples that pay greater concern to history, and a focus on ethical and
political concepts in which he believes science holds little promise for
progress. But when he gives an example-"how the modern world and its
special expectations came to replace the ancien rigine," how we came to
use certain political concepts in place of ones used before 20 1 it is once
again no longer clear how much philosophy, as it is practiced today, could
contribute. Such work is empirical; only the empirical data it relies on are
historical facts. And it is not as though questions or attempts to answer
them are in some sense novel. Intelletual historians write on little else.
Most philosophers lack the requisite knowledge of history to address
these questions. But the problem is not simply that. Even if we are
interested in trying to articulate a contemporary "sense of ourselves" about
which philosophers may be better informed, much of philosophy has
become, perhaps inevitably, too complex, too esoteric, too far-removed
from worldly matters to be helpful to most people. As sales figures (if
nothing else) attest, contemporary fiction, cinema, and news media play a
far more significant role in all this than the closed circle of
professionalized philosophy. Exactly because of their sophistication it
seems that philosophers' accounts are not likely to be particularly helpful
(or accurate) as accounts of our collective self-understanding (if there is
such a thing).
V. TOWARD A NEW APPROACH TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY?
We have reached what looks like a rather grim conclusion. The existing
midway position between science and the humanities is unclear about its
aims and about its methodology, and the alternatives do not look much
better. Against the expanding domain of science, legal philosophers have
adopted, perhaps partly inadvertently, a strategy of narrowing down their
conception of what counts as belonging in their domain for the sake of
retaining its independence. As other domains encroached upon its
province, jurisprudence turned to the question "what is law?" answered by
a priori reflection as defining its domain because it seemed like the sort of
question that would not, indeed could not, be taken by any other
discipline. There was safety in this question, for it meant both that much of
200. WILLIAMS, HuMANISTIC DISCIPLINE, supra note 5, at 189.
201. Id. at 190.
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the empirical work on law was irrelevant (and therefore could be safely
ignored), and that the independent existence of jurisprudence so conceived
could not be challenged by other disciplines.
Against the challenge from science, the decision to go down this
conceptual route seems plausible, but in retrospect I think it is quite clear
now that this approach has achieved very little and that its shortcomings
are so fundamental that no fine-tuning could salvage it. This conclusion
seems to be in line with contemporary work on the methodology of legal
philosophy, which expresses unease about the position and job of legal
philosophy within other academic legal studies.202
What's next, then, for jurisprudence? This may well be a topic for a
different essay, but here I wish to propose a tentative solution, one that
tries to maintain something of the idea of jurisprudence standing between
science and the humanities, but does so in an entirely different way from
the currently prevalent approach. As we have seen, the current view
combines a scientific aim of description with a humanistic method of
inquiry. A more fruitful approach may be the opposite: it would adopt
aims similar to those of political philosophy by focusing on questions of
normativity and legitimacy, focusing in particular on the question of the
legitimacy of law as distinct from the question of the legitimacy of the
state, but it would be much more cognizant of scientific work, especially
in the domain of cognitive psychology, and its potential significance to
answering these questions. This approach could thus maintain the concern
with the "internal point of view" by examining the role law plays in
people's lives and the way these issues touch on questions of legitimacy
but adopt an "external" methodology for answering this question.
There are several important reasons to adopt this approach. One is that
science can help us achieve greater clarity among conflicting internalist
accounts of law. For example, there are two familiar understandings of law
that are both "internalist" in different ways but that seem to be in tension
with each other. The first is the view that law has its own internal set of
concepts and ideas. It is the sense of "thinking like a lawyer" that students
are supposed to learn in law school. The second is the image of the law
that aims to be comprehensible to all its addressees, lawyers and non-
lawyers alike. So fundamental is this idea is that it makes up one of the
central meanings of the rule of law. Which of these is more accurate?
202. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 151, at 131-35, 164-75; Andrew Halpin, The Methodology of
Jurisprudence: Thirty Years off the Point, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 67, 68 (2006); Danny Priel, Free-
Floating from Reality, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 429, 443-45 (2008).
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Scientific method could help in examining whether learning to think
like a lawyer really does change the way lawyers treat legal problems.
What matters here is not whether lawyers and non-lawyers use different
language in dealing with legal problems: no doubt they often do. The
interesting question is whether these terminological differences reflect a
deeper way of solving such issues. This is something anyone interested in
the "internal" or "legal" point of view should be interested in, but it also
looks like a question on which traditional introspective method is
singularly incapable of answering. If it turns out that it does, it remains,
however, an open question to what extent this is a good or a bad feature of
a legal system.
I am not sure what would emerge from this. Perhaps the end result
would amount to a change in the subject, perhaps even something that by
today's standards would no longer be called philosophy. It is clear,
however, that such change is vital. How exactly it would come about and
what jurisprudence would look like afterward should be the biggest
questions on jurisprudents' agendas for the near future.
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